Hardly a week passes without a media report concerning the growing chasm between American Jews and Israelis over issues of culture, religion and politics. The recent Israeli elections may aggravate the divide.
On the afternoon of March 17, 1992, Israel’s embassy in Argentina was reduced to rubble by a blast that killed 29 people – four Israelis and 25 Argentinians – and injured nearly 250. A group tied to Hezbollah, a proxy for Iran, claimed responsibility.
Everything that could go wrong went wrong with a vengeance on the night of September 17, when four Israeli Air Force F-16s launched a successfully destructive raid on a warehouse in Latakia where sensitive military items destined for delivery to Hezbollah in Lebanon were apparently stored.
For now, the US, Israel, the EU and some Arab states appear more willing to help the Palestinians in Gaza than their own leaders. This, of course, is not new. It is the tragic ongoing curse of Palestinian history.
With no grand solutions either violent or peaceful at hand, the IDF's preferred option remains conflict management. At its core lies the old, ugly but useful concept that has always been central to Israel's security doctrine: deterrence, writ large.