Counterterrorism Watch
European Attitudes Toward Hamas and Hizballah
European Attitudes Toward Hamas and Hizballah
The devastating July 2005 suicide bombing attacks in London have reignited European awareness of the gravity of the Islamic extremist threat to the continent and to the wider international community. One of Britain's initial responses to the bombings was to draft new antiterror legislation creating new criminal offenses of inciting terrorism and of giving or receiving training in terrorist techniques. Britain also urged the European Union (EU) to adopt more stringent antiterrorism measures. Indeed, at a July meeting in Brussels, EU justice and interior ministers agreed to accelerate the implementation of antiterrorism measures designed to cut off funding to terrorist groups and boost the sharing of intelligence required in terrorism investigations. Yet, despite all the rhetoric about the dangers of Islamic radicalism and the urgency of enacting new legislative proposals to combat terrorism, the European Union continues to fail to take critical steps toward combating Islamic extremism. The EU, for example, maintains a list of designated foreign terrorist organizations. It is unlawful to send funds from the EU to the designated groups, and EU member states are required to freeze the assets of the organizations. Initially, the EU list comprised only Europe-based terrorist groups, but in May 2002, the EU added non-European organizations and individuals to the list. Conspicuously absent from the initial EU list were the Islamic terrorist organizations Palestinian Hamas and the Shiite Lebanese Hezbollah. Hamas is a leading perpetrator of suicide bombing attacks against innocent Israeli men, women, and children in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Despite temporary ceasefires and talk of joining a Palestinian government in the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas continues to make clear its desired goal of annihilating the State of Israel and replacing it with an Islamic state. Based in southern Lebanon, the Iranian and Syrian-supported Hezbollah is well known for its violent attacks against Western targets in Lebanon and Jewish targets abroad, as well as for its attacks on Israeli soldiers and northern Israeli communities. It is less well known for its increasing presence in and involvement with Palestinian terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza. Hezbollah became involved in Palestinian terrorism following Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000. Hezbollah operatives today recruit, train and fund Palestinian terrorists. The organization sends money, weapons, and expertise to the territories. It supports the families of Palestinian suicide bombers and smuggles Palestinians into southern Lebanon and Iran for terrorist training. Israeli authorities believe that Hezbollah is involved in up to 80 percent of terrorist attacks emanating from the West Bank. Furthermore, and perhaps of more import to Europe, is the fact that Hamas and Hezbollah both maintain an operational presence on European soil. Hamas uses European-based Islamic charities and other front organizations to funnel money to the organization. One such charity, Al-Aqsa Foundation, has already been banned in several European countries. Indications of Hamas terrorist activity in Europe also exist. In April 2003, two British Muslims carried out a Hamas suicide bombing in Tel Aviv. Evidence has recently emerged that one of the London suicide bombers, Pakistani Mohammed Siddique Khan, allegedly spent a day in Israel in February 2003, fueling speculation of a possible Hamas-related link between Khan and the two British-born Pakistanis who perpetrated the 2003 attack. Hezbollah also uses European-based charities and front organizations to fund-raise and channel money to the organizations. Its operational presence in Europe is far more vast and sophisticated than that of Hamas. Hezbollah maintains terror cells throughout Europe and uses Europe as an operational launching pad from which to send its operatives into Israel. Arriving with false European documents, these operatives engage in surveillance of Israeli targets, recruit terrorists, and have tried to perpetrate terrorist attacks. After much prodding from its allies, the EU agreed to list Hamas as a terrorist group in September 2003. Yet, despite the presence of Hamas on its terrorist list, the EU recently indicated a willingness to engage in dialogue with the terrorist organization and murmurings of removing Hamas from the EU list of terror organizations have begun to be heard. Regarding Hezbollah, the EU continues to refrain from listing it as a terrorist organization. (It does list Hezbollah terrorist Imad Mughniyah, but not his organization.) Against the above background of Hamas and Hezbollah's clear links to terrorist activity and their increasing operational presence in Europe, what accounts for the EU's weakness and lack of resolve with regard to these terrorist organizations?
European Perspectives on Terrorism To understand Europe's approach toward Hamas and Hezbollah, it is necessary to examine some general European perspectives on terrorism. Most significantly, Europe tends to view terrorism as a problem with "root causes." If the underlying causes can be identified and addressed, terrorism, the argument goes, would cease. Specifically, if poverty, disenfranchisement, and alleged Israeli oppression of the Palestinians would end, so too would suicide bombings and other forms of terrorist violence. In looking at Hamas and Hezbollah, therefore, the EU sees their terrorist activity as emerging from the legitimate plight of their downtrodden constituents, and therefore, on some level, justified. In the wake of the recent London bombings, the "root causes" argument has resurfaced. Secondly, Europe has long held that it is possible to separate the political and military wings of a terrorist organization. The EU had based its initial refusal to list Hamas as a terrorist organization on the flawed argument that Hamas's political wing, which services Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, was unconnected to the military wing that sponsors deadly suicide bombings and other violent attacks. The EU ignored the reality that money is fungible, and money raised for "political" and "humanitarian" purposes is easily channeled between the different wings of an organization. Europe also turned a blind eye to the terrorist education, incitement, indoctrination, and recruitment efforts of Hamas's so-called "political wing." In September 2003, several weeks after a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem that killed twenty-three people, the EU belatedly acknowledged the connection between Hamas's military and political wings and listed Hamas as a terrorist organization. The same reasoning continues to apply to Europe's refusal to list Hezbollah. The EU views Hezbollah as a legitimate and popular political and social service organization in southern Lebanon. It again refuses to acknowledge that its military and political wings share resources and work together. Epitomizing this reasoning was the September 2004 meeting in Beirut of the EU representative in London, Patrick Renauld with Hezbollah head Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Thirdly, Europe tends to project its own liberal values of pragmatism, tolerance, and compromise onto others. It views the path that the European continent took from barbarism to enlightenment as a paradigm for other parts of the globe. The EU genuinely believes that Hamas and Hezbollah have important roles to play in advancing Middle East peace. When Europe sees Hezbollah providing social services to poor Lebanese and capturing an increasing number of seats in the Lebanese parliament, it translates those phenomena into a façade of Hezbollah moderation. When EU leaders see Hamas funding Palestinian hospitals and kindergartens and gaining ascendancy in Palestinian elections, it also projects a false pragmatism onto the terrorist organization. Finally, the European Union looks toward international law and multilateral frameworks for guidance in combating terrorism. Although the U.S., Canada, and Australia list Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, for example, the United Nations does not. Cracks in the European Position Recently, cracks in the European position have surfaced, and several EU states reportedly favor a ban on Hezbollah and Hezbollah-sponsored activities. There has been a flurry of activity with regard to Hezbollah's television network, Al-Manar. France and the Netherlands recently ordered its satellite providers, Eutelstat and New Skies Satellite, respectively, to end Al-Manar broadcasts. In March 2005, EU broadcasting regulators agreed to ban satellite broadcasts of Hezbollah's Al-Manar television network. In June 2005, the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism, and Commerce, which oversees the state-owned Hispasat, announced the removal of Hezbollah's Al-Manar television from broadcast to Latin America. More significantly, in March 2005, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a nonbinding resolution (473-8) on the situation in Lebanon, which included the following comments about Hezbollah: "... and calls on Syria not to tolerate any form of terrorism, including support for the operations of Hezbollah and other armed groups; Considers that clear evidence exists of terrorist activities on the part of Hezbollah and that the Council should take all necessary steps to curtail them." Several days later, a group of European parliamentarians sent a letter to the EU Council of Ministers urging them to place Hezbollah on the EU terrorism list. Since that time, several European leaders have urged the EU to list Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.
In the wake of the atrocities in London, it remains to be seen whether evidence of the international terrorist connections of British-born Muslims will impact European attitudes toward Hamas and Hezbollah. Bluma Zuckerbrot-Finkelstein is a consultant and freelance writer on Israel, the Middle East, and international terrorism. She is a lecturer in Zionist history and the Arab-Israeli conflict at the University of Memphis. She is the editor of Counterterrorism Watch. |
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