Discrimination Movement leaders, of course, are aware of the lack of growth but continually express the belief that the situation has now changed and that the movement will soon expand greatly. Transcripts of many of the interviews conducted for this study are replete with comments like "We were a small movement in the past, but we are on the verge of tremendous growth in the very near future." Similar statements were recorded throughout the 1980s. One reason given for the lack of significant growth in the past is that religious and political discrimination against the movement inhibited its acceptance in Israel.

In the past, Reform groups wishing to rent halls and school buildings for their services were prevented from doing so by political and religious threats against the premises' owners. These included threats against the owners to withdraw Orthodox certificates of kashrut if a non-Orthodox congregation was allowed the use of their facilities. Congregations had difficulty obtaining land for construction of a synagogue. All sorts of objections were raised by Orthodox persons and by the Orthodox members of the Municipal Council in Tel Aviv against the construction of the new Kedem synagogue (now Beit Daniel), which finally opened in 1991. In this case, as in others, some non-Orthodox council members also opposed the construction of the Progressive synagogue. The reason for this, according to Progressive movement leaders, is deep-seated hatred of Reform by some council members. Others "simply have no values, and consider it legitimate to oppose Reform as part of their political game--the motivation is political, and not ideological." A Reform kindergarten in Mevasseret Zion, a suburb of Jerusalem, was subject to an arson attack on the eve of the school year in September 1997. While the arsonists were not found or identified, the act came after a summer of incitement against the kindergarten by the Orthodox Sephardi party, Shas.

Opponents of non-Orthodox Judaism in Israel often condemn the liberal movements as non-Jewish. In a symposium on denominations in Judaism conducted for military instructors in 1989, Rabbi Ben-Porath, the head of Or Sameach (an Orthodox yeshiva noted for its recruitment of ba'alei teshuva, or repentants), explained his refusal to sit on the dais together with liberal rabbis because "sitting with the Reform and Conservative movements is worse than sitting with the PLO, because while the PLO wishes to destroy the state, these movements want to destroy Judaism itself."21

The head of the Conversion Authority in the Chief Rabbinate's office, Rabbi Israel Rosen, fearful that the Supreme Court might recognize a Reform conversion, proposed recognizing the Reform movement as a separate religious community in Israel because, he explained, "Reform is anyway a different religion in every manner--it allows intermarriage and conversion via a very weak ceremony, and does not believe in the Torah [as having been given to the people of Israel] on Mount Sinai." Since "Reform Judaism is anyway not our religion," he advocated publicly stating that they are a different community. He would allow Reform conversions, on condition that the registration document would state "conversion to the 'Reform religion.'"22

Another area of discrimination is the government funding allocated to the movement. The movement has for years complained that it did not receive equitable funding for providing the same services as Orthodox institutions. A petition to the High Court of Justice on this topic by Hebrew Union College, the Movement for Progressive Judaism, and the (Conservative) Movement for Masorti Judaism led to an agreement in 1994 that was officially sanctioned by the court. While the agreement did not accord recognition to the Reform and Conservative movements, it did stipulate that funds would be granted to them.23 The director general of the Ministry of Religious Affairs announced that the ministry would abide by the court-sanctioned agreement (behavior that is not self-evident in Israeli society), but that the non-Orthodox movements would not receive money from funds designated for "Torah culture and supplementary religious education, "but rather from the budget line designated for "support for additional religious institutions."24

The result was that in 1995, Hebrew Union College was granted NIS 200,000 (about $66,500). This sum, which constituted less than half a percent of the ministry's Torah culture allocations, included money for Torah classes (NIS 48,800), seminars for the transmission of Judaism and its values (NIS 32,350), and bar mitzvah instruction (NIS 47,000). Additional sums were allocated for the training of Torah leaders and the preparation of religious youth for military service.25 Ultra-Orthodox Knesset Member (MK) Avraham Ravitz (United Torah Judaism) complained that Minister of Religious Affairs Shimon Shetreet "performed an inexcusable act by allowing the Reform to squeeze the public coffers. The Reform movement . . . has much money and it is chutzpa that they lay claim to the meager funds of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and steal the lone sheep of the religious public."26 The movement had to petition the court again in 1997, accusing the Ministry of Religious Affairs with contempt of court after the ministry ceased its allo-cations to Hebrew Union College. An agreement was reached, with the assistance of the Ministry of Justice, to grant the college NIS 750,000 (about $214,000) to cover the sums owed up to the end of 1996. Additional petitions regarding government allocations to the liberal movements in Israel are still pending. Movement leaders say that the lesson learned, once again, is that rights will be obtained only by continual court action.

Discrimination is not uniform, and there are instances where local municipal councils have granted congregations land for construction with little problem and sometimes for just a symbolic fee. Land for the campus of the Hebrew Union College in Jerusalem (dedicated in 1963) was granted to the college for just one U.S. dollar. Hebrew Union College then cooperated with the World Union for Progressive Judaism, which established its office on the campus. (The construction of the campus was protested by Orthodox religious and political figures.) Land for the construction of Congregation Kol Hanshama in Jerusalem was obtained after a physical attack against the congregation by the Sephardi community rabbi on Simchat Torah in 1985. The attack infuriated the mayor, Teddy Kolek, and he decided to respond by allocating land for the construction of a permanent congregation.

Recognition of Reform Rabbis

Besides the physical hurdles placed before the movement, there are more fundamental policies that not only impede its functioning in Israel but also serve to delegitimize it on a symbolic level. Of primary importance is the way the rabbis are treated. Orthodox leaders regularly refer to Reform clergy by the English term "rabbis" even when speaking Hebrew, in order to stress their foreign nature, and to indicate that they are not true rabbanim (sing.: rav).

More significant is that marriages performed in Israel by Reform rabbis are not recognized by the civil authorities. A petition against this situation was rejected by the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, which found that the minister of religion was acting within his authority to accept the opinion of the Chief Rabbinical Council in Israel, which denied Reform rabbis the right to register marriages.27 No one prevents couples who wish to be married by a Reform rabbi in Israel from doing so, but in order for their marriage to be recognized by the civil authorities, they must undergo an additional wedding. They can go abroad and take part in an additional (civil) procedure that is recognized by Israeli authorities. Cyprus is a popular venue for these weddings, and they have therefore come to be called Cypriot marriages. According to MK Naomi Hazan (Meretz), during 1992-94 1,826 couples underwent Cypriot marriages and 2,055 couples married by mail (Paraguay marriages).28 Occasionally couples marry in the Orthodox rabbinate in a perfunctory ceremony, treating that as a civil procedure, and then have their "religious" ceremony at a wedding celebration presided over by a non-Orthodox rabbi. Hazan estimates that 15 percent of those marrying each year are utilizing "alternative" or "civil" procedures.29

Conversions performed by the movement in Israel are also not recognized by religious or state authorities. Arguing that their conversion procedures should be registered in accordance with civil law, the Reform and Conservative movements petitioned the Supreme Court in 1995 to have their converts registered under the Population Registry Law. As noted earlier, the head of the Conversion Authority in the Chief Rabbinate's office, Rabbi Israel Rosen, was prepared to allow Reform conversions as long as they were registered as such in the Population Registry, since he views Reform as a different sect.

The Supreme Court had actually considered the analogy of comparing Reform Judaism with other sects, specifically, the Karaites, when it had earlier deliberated the recognition of Reform rabbis for registering marriages. The court found a basic difference between the Karaites and Reform, in that membership in the Karaites is based upon birth while membership in Reform is based upon belief.

The head of the Reform movement's Israel Religious Action Center (to be discussed below), Rabbi Uri Regev, rejected Rabbi Rosen's attempt to isolate the Reform movement, noting that Reform is inseparably part of Israel. He also characterized as a bluff a suggestion by Minister for Religious Affairs Shimon Shetreet that Reform and Conservative conversions in Israel be broadcast to Reform and Conservative religious courts abroad via satellite, and that those foreign courts issue conversion certificates that would be recognized in Israel, since the conversions would really be done in Israel. Nevertheless, he voiced the opinion that thousands of Israelis would utilize this opportunity if it were enacted in law.30

Issues relating to the rabbis have been discussed because the issues themselves, and the reaction of the parties, indicate the tremendous obstacles the movement has to overcome in order to operate on a par with Orthodox Judaism. One could argue that the lack of recognition of the movement's rabbis does not really have a severe impact on members of the movement. Rabbis can lead their congregations and serve the spiritual needs of their members. They can perform bar and bat mitzvah ceremonies. Many of the couples seeking a Reform marriage ceremony are not members, but rather persons from outside the movement.

But, of course, lack of recognition and official standing affects the manner in which the movement is perceived by nonmembers, and the extent to which it can be perceived as a religious or spiritual alternative to Orthodox Judaism. Lack of recognition and official legitimacy has an impact on the perceived lack of authenticity. This not only affects the expansion possibilities of the movement but also the very identity of Reform Jews everywhere.

The question "Who is a Jew?" with regard to conversion is sometimes presented as really a question of "Who is a rabbi?," meaning which rabbis are granted recognition as real clergy and can function to determine religious issues.31 But the question "Who is a rabbi?" has an impact on the Jewish identity of those who accept a person as their rabbi. While the Orthodox may argue that they do not question the Jewish identity of Reform Jews born to Jewish parents, questioning the legitimacy of Reform rabbis means that a salient part of their Jewish identity--their identity as Reform Jews--is also questioned. In this case, the message really is aimed at Jews outside of Israel, particularly in the United States. The message received, even if the senders claim that it is unintended and inaccurate, is that your religious belief, and your religious identity, are not authentic. The message is even stronger than the insinuation that to be religious one has to be Orthodox. The message is that if one wants to be part of the Jewish religion, one has to accept the premise of Orthodoxy as the yardstick of religious belief and practice. This is also reflected in the way the movement is treated in local religious councils, to which we now turn.

Religious Councils

Religious councils are essentially administrative bodies responsible for the provision of religious services in local communities. Council members are appointed by three bodies: the local municipality appoints 45 percent of the members, the minister for religious affairs 45 percent, and the local rabbinate 10 percent. Local religious councils are essentially representatives of the political parties.32

A conflict that occasionally arises regarding the formation of the religious councils relates to the appointment of nonreligious Jews to the councils. In a court case regarding the appointment of nonreligious members to the Jerusalem council, lawyers for the Haredi political factions claimed that it was incongruous for individuals who were not interested in the services provided by the religious councils to supervise the services.33 The argument of the nonreligious political parties is that religious services are provided to nonreligious Jews as well as to religious Jews, and the former therefore deserve representation on the councils.

A new type of challenge to the traditional nature of the religious councils was made in 1987 by Leah Shakdiel, an Orthodox woman who sought a seat on the religious council in Yerucham. Until then, religious councils were male bastions. While she won election to the council, her appointment was actually made only after a successful petition to the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice.34 Opposition to her appointment was based solely on the fact that she was a woman. That case is relevant to all Jewish religious movements because the Chief Rabbinate took a stand in this case (as it had not in earlier petitions), and the Chief Rabbinate's position (against the appointment of a woman) was rejected by the court in a precedent-setting manner.

The Orthodox establishment has consistently opposed the election of Reform and Conservative members, and has basically ignored court decisions to cease this policy of discrimination. A 1994 ruling by the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, required new elections to the religious councils of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem inasmuch as candidates identified as Reform or Conservative Jews had been disqualified from consideration because of their religious beliefs. The petitions had been initiated in 1989 by the rejected candidates, the political parties that had proposed them, and by the Reform and Conservative movements (and in Jerusalem, by the League for Civil Rights). The court restated the position that it had taken in the past, namely, that candidates for religious councils had to have some religious feeling, but they did not have to be actually religious (dati). The court explained that religious councils are different from the Chief Rabbinate since they are administrative bodies while the Chief Rabbinate is responsible for making halakhic decisions. It would therefore be appropriate to require that officials of the Chief Rabbinate be religious, or Orthodox.35 The court decision paved the way for the election of Bruria Barish, a former chairperson of the Israel Movement for Progressive Judaism, as the first woman member of the Tel Aviv religious council.

Orthodox opposition to the court's decision was not long in coming. MK Moshe Gafni (United Torah Judaism) compared Barish's participation in the religious council to a terrorist's penetration of army headquarters. The state chief rabbis convened rabbis, religious court judges, and members of the religious councils in February 1994 to protest the inclusion of non-Orthodox members in the religious councils. Jerusalem chief rabbi Yitzchak Kolitz stated that it was inconceivable that civil judges who knew nothing about Torah should be allowed to determine halakhic matters.36 The upshot is that Barish's appointment has still not been confirmed by the minister of religious affairs, despite the court decision. This has led to an additional petition, and the case is still pending before the court.

The most far-reaching decision on this topic was rendered in 1997, when the Supreme Court (again sitting as the High Court of Justice) ruled in favor of a petition requiring the appointment of a Reform woman, Dr. Joyce Brenner, to the local religious council in Netanya. In this case the court actually ordered the minister of religious affairs to sign the requisite documents of appointment. The minister, a member of the Haredi Shas Party, would not do this, and the prime minister usurped his authority and signed the papers in his stead. The Netanya religious council has not held a meeting since the signing of the documents in order to prevent Dr. Brenner's participation.

As can be seen, issues relating to religion in general, and the Reform movement in particular, are coming under court challenges in a concerted and unprecedented manner. The issues listed in the previous sections have all come under the aegis of a relatively new institution in the Israel Reform movement, the Israel Religious Action Center.

The Israel Religious Action Center (IRAC)

Lack of legitimacy stemming from absence of official recognition can be challenged in a variety of ways. If a large enough public supporting the delegitimated group can be recruited, it can exert political pressure to secure official recognition. In the absence of widespread political support, the movement has undertaken an ambitious legal program challenging religious inequality in the courts.

The Israel Religious Action Center (IRAC) is the Israel Movement for Progressive Judaism's advocacy group on issues of religion and state. The center primarily focuses on issues relating to religion and religious pluralism in Israel. Its involvement in broader questions of human rights--e.g., Palestinian rights and the rights of same-sex couples--is more restricted, due to its limited resources and to the fact that there are other bodies in Israel that deal with those issues.

IRAC was founded in 1987. Its executive director, Rabbi Uri Regev, is a graduate of the Israeli Reform rabbinic program and a lawyer. Under his leadership, IRAC has become one of the most prominent institutions of the movement, starting from its early success in uncovering scandal regarding improper government allocations to Orthodox institutions. Rabbi Regev has succeeded in obtaining financial support for the center that enables it to carry on a variety of programs, including the establishment of legal advocacy centers for olim. This program, begun in 1992, provides counseling and legal advice for new immigrants, helps the immigrants gain recognition under the Law of Return, and assists them with legal questions regarding housing, employment, and medical care.

The most important activity undertaken by IRAC, with regard to the recognition of the Reform movement, is its legal advocacy for religious pluralism. Legal cases regarding state and religion in the past were often brought by individual plaintiffs in an unorganized manner. While cases like those involving Brother Daniel and Binyamin Shalit37 were significant in challenging the religious and political establishment, they were sporadic contests, with limited effect in changing the overall balance of religion and state.

The Movement for Progressive Judaism in Israel already passed a resolution at its 1981 annual conference calling upon its leaders to take legal action to enable non-Orthodox rabbis to carry out all the activities performed by Orthodox rabbis in Israel.38 Now, IRAC is focusing its legal attack in a systematic and organized manner. Never has the Orthodox political and religious establishment faced such a barrage of simultaneous challenges on a wide front. As IRAC prepared cases regarding the recognition of conversion in 1997, it was simultaneously launching legal challenges to the composition of religious councils in several cities besides Netanya.

IRAC's activities are financially supported by ARZA (the Association of Reform Zionists of America, to be discussed below) and by contributions from foundations and private individuals. Rabbi Uri Regev and ARZA's executive director, Rabbi Ammiel Hirsch, maintain close contact with one another. They routinely discuss proposed actions and legal cases and the implications these can have for Israeli society as well as for Reform Judaism and Jews in Israel and the United States. IRAC is also having an impact on the Conservative movement in Israel, drawing it, too, into a more adversarial relationship with the Israeli establishment. The legal activity of IRAC, whether relating to recognition of Reform conversions or challenging the discriminatory practices involving the composition of local religious councils, is establishing Reform Judaism (and the center) as the primary challengers of the religious status quo in Israel.

There are those in the movement who criticize the strategy of IRAC. Some complain that adversarial action will not attract new members, and that activities that will help expose Reform Judaism to more Jewish Israelis should be the main focus of the movement. The movement faces an interesting dilemma in this regard in that its struggle can lead it to be perceived as challenging religion in Israeli life, and the movement might accordingly come to be perceived as antireligious.39 In fact, it opposes the political establishment that grants Orthodoxy such a dominant role in political life, but it is not antireligious per se. Indeed, it is not even anti-Orthodox (although it is against Orthodox coercion), but the movement is still having difficulty explaining to the public just what Reform does stand for rather than what it stands against. Adversarial policies might also alienate some members (but probably not many) who merely want to find a home in their local congregations without their movement becoming embroiled in national politics.

Part of the reason for the movement's more militant stance in recent years is that, in its efforts to create a more "Israeli" movement, it has encouraged native-born Israelis to enter the Reform rabbinical program. The first graduates have assumed positions of national leadership in their movement, and these persons who grew up in Israel are more willing than many im-migrants to challenge the Israeli religious establishment in the courts. A debate in 1987 between the American-born former director of the Conservative movement and an Israeli-born adviser to the (non-Orthodox) foreign minister and former prime minister serves as an example. The adviser, Avraham Burg (now head of the Jewish Agency), recommended that the movement seek recognition and legitimation "in the legal system, according to the rules by which the game of politics is played in Israel." The Conservative leader protested that "Conservative Judaism is not politics. Israel needs Conservative Judaism as a religion, and it has to adjust to it if it wishes to remain a Jewish state at all. The problem is not the future of Conservative Judaism but the future of Israel." It is significant that the Conservative movement's willingness to follow Reform's judicial path is led by its new Israeli-born leader, Ehud Bendel, himself a member of the civil rights-oriented Meretz Party.

Additional criticism relates to attempts to enlist movement members in the United States in support of the movement's struggle in Israel. The director of Israel programs of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Rabbi David Forman, feels that denouncing discriminatory religious practices in Israel in order to gain the support of American Jews might alienate people from Israel, especially those who are least committed to Israel and Judaism. While some other individuals share this feeling, it does not represent the majority position in the movement in Israel or in the United States.

Finally, there are those who complain that the money expended by the center could be used to help develop congre-gations and community centers. The response to this charge is that people and foundations are attracted specifically by the center's legal, civil rights-oriented activities, and the donors are not interested in supporting other movement activities. The critics of the center admit this point, but say that the ability to solicit funds for the movement is limited, and that solicitation of funds for the center reduces the prospect of funds for other purposes.

The center's policies are determined by a steering committee composed of representatives from movement institutions, including the Israel Movement for Progressive Judaism, ARZA (the Association of Reform Zionists of America), the World Union for Progressive Judaism, MARAM, Hebrew Union College, and Arzenu (the Zionist organization of the World Union for Progressive Judaism). The representatives of the Israel Movement for Progressive Judaism have the right to appeal decisions of this board relating to proposed center activities and to demand that issues for decision be brought before the board of the movement in Israel, but this has never happened.

The Conversion Bill

The Israeli government's policy, since 1970, has been to recognize non-Orthodox conversions abroad but only Orthodox conversions within Israel. The Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Act (Marriage and Divorce) (Amendment) (Conversion)--1997 Bill,40 which has come to be known as the Conversion Bill, was proposed in reaction to a 1995 decision by the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.41 In this case, a Brazilian woman converted by the bet din of the Council of Progressive Rabbis in Israel petitioned to be registered as a Jew and receive a visa as an immigrant (olah). In its decision, the court drew a distinction between civil registration and matters relating to personal status. (Laws of personal status include laws pertaining to marriage, divorce, and conversion, which by Knesset legislation are under the authority of the official rabbinate of Israel.) Issues relating to personal status, the court ruled in a 6-1 vote, must conform to the requirements of the Mandatory Religious Community (Change) Act, which means that Orthodox law applies to these issues. However, recognition of a conversion performed in Israel, regarding the Population Registry Law and the Law of Return, is not subject to the requirements of the Mandatory Act.

The decision should have resulted in a court order to the Ministry of the Interior to register Mrs. Pessaro as a Jew, but the Supreme Court acted in an extremely cautious manner, according to one of Israel's experts in constitutional law, and stopped short of issuing such an order.42 Justice Barak noted that the court was not taking any stand on the question as to which conversion in Israel constitutes a conversion for the purpose of the Law of Return, nor did the court take a stand on the question of whether every Reform conversion performed in Israel would be recognized as a conversion for the purpose of the Law of Return. The court explained its decision by saying that "this question has not been presented to us at all." Instead, the Knesset was to be given the opportunity to set standards for recognizing conversions in this area.

The reaction on the part of the Orthodox political parties was to press for legislation that would declare that the State of Israel recognizes only Orthodox conversions. Indeed, the promise to submit such a bill had been contained in the Netanyahu government's coalition agreement with the Orthodox parties, Shas, the National Religious Party, and United Torah Judaism. In fact, Shimon Peres, while prime minister, had also promised to support the passage of such a bill, but he left office before a bill could be introduced. The Conversion Bill, which passed its first reading (three readings, or votes, are required to adopt a law) in 1997 by a vote of 51 to 32 with seven abstentions, states that "the conversion of a person in Israel will be in accordance with the Law of the Torah" (din torah), and that no conversion will be recognized without the approval of the president of the Supreme Rabbinical Court, i.e., the chief rabbi of Israel. In principle, the bill did not affect the right of Reform and Conservative Jews who undergo conversions abroad to have those conversions registered by the minister of the interior, although, according to the head of MARAM, the ministry has ceased registering such conversions in the past year. Furthermore, MK Rabbi Moshe Gafni (United Torah Judaism) stated in the Knesset that the bill is just a scaffold for an additional bill that would extend the rejection of non-Orthodox conversions to those performed abroad.43

Shimon Peres, now in opposition, stated at a meeting of the Labor Party that "the passage of the bill will mean isolation and division among the Jewish people."44 While the Labor Party voted against the bill, a conspicuous number of party members were absent from the vote--indicating their support of the bill. This recalled the statement by Haim Ramon, interior minister when Labor was still in power more than a year earlier, that he favored legislation that would make it impossible to recognize Reform conversions in Israel and that unless 300,000 Reform members came to Israel, the only communities to be recognized in Israel would be the Orthodox and the secular. Ramon was quoted as telling a visiting delegation of fifty Reform rabbis organized by ARZA: "I don't tell you what to do in the U.S.; don't tell me what to do here."45 In response to the absence of his colleagues from the 1997 vote, Ramon said that it would have been preferable to allow the members of the Labor Party to vote as they wished rather than to have imposed a party decision on them.46 Labor Party chair Ehud Barak told the delegates to the World Zionist Congress in December 1997 that his party will vote against the bill if it comes up for a final vote.

The proposed legislation threatened to cause a severe rift between the State of Israel and non-Orthodox Jews abroad. Rabbi Eric Yoffie, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, said that passage of the bill would constitute a declaration of war on American Jews. Speaking on Israeli radio, he said: "If the Reform rabbis in Israel are not rabbis and the conversions are not conversions, that means that our Judaism is not Judaism and we are second-rate Jews."47 That, of course, is basically the position of the Orthodox parties, although they are generally careful to point out that they accept Reform and Conservative Jews on an individual basis unless they were converted to Judaism by the non-Orthodox movements.

The leaders of the Reform and Conservative movements in the United States, following the first reading of the Conversion Bill, recommended that affiliate congregations ban visits by Knesset members who vote for the final bill. Some rabbis also called on their congregants to channel their financial contributions to Israel to Reform and Conservative institutions.48 MK Rubi Rivlin (Likud) characterized the recommendation of the Reform movement as "contempt for the people of Israel and Israeli democracy" and he called on the speaker of the Knesset to forbid all Knesset members from taking part in Reform movement events until the leaders retract their threat and apologize.49

The relevance of American Jewry to Israel comes to the fore in these incidents, which received considerable attention in the Israeli press and which were taken quite seriously by politicians and religious leaders. Negotiations regarding the bill, which, after all, was under consideration by the Israeli legislature, were held in New York with non-Orthodox movement leaders. American leaders were asked by Israeli politicians to use their influence and have the court petitions brought by the Israel movement placed in abeyance, while a compromise solution was worked out that would forestall the Conversion Bill,50 but nothing much emerged from this meeting.

An agreement was reached later in Israel as a result of an unprecedented meeting between the prime minister and the heads of the American liberal movements (see Appendix A). The invitation extended by the prime minister to the heads of the movements indicated his recognition of the impact that the bill would have, and he invited the foreign leaders, and not the leaders of the movements in Israel, in order to downplay that impact. In the end, an agreement was reached to establish an official committee, chaired by Yaakov Ne'eman, an Orthodox Jew who had served as minister of justice and who was soon to be appointed minister of finance, to deal with the conversion issue. An additional committee was formed to deal with the issue of the conversion of non-Jewish minors adopted by Israeli nonreligious couples. This related to a petition to the High Court of Justice brought by Na'amat and the Conservative movement.51

The Ne'eman committee, as is the nature of government committees dealing with thorny political issues, conducted many sessions and missed many "final deadlines" in its attempt to reach a compromise. The Israel Reform movement achieved a new level of independence in its dealings with the committee. Rabbi Uri Regev, executive director of the Israel Religious Action Center, served as the Reform movement's representative to the committee and was responsible for reporting to all arms of the movement about what was happening and coordinating a decision process about how to proceed. The participants in this process included the head of MARAM, the chairman of the board and the executive director of the Israel Movement for Progressive Judaism, and the heads of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations in the United States, the Central Conference of American Rabbis, the executive director of the World Union for Progressive Judaism, and the heads of ARZA and the Hebrew Union College. While advice was given from abroad, the Israeli leaders were granted the authority and autonomy to decide whether to accept or reject the final Ne'eman committee recommendations.

The committee's work was made more complex when the scope of its mandate was expanded to include the recognition of marriages conducted by non-Orthodox rabbis. In addition, Ne'eman himself proposed that his committee also deal with the issue of non-Orthodox representation on local religious councils. Bundling so many issues into one committee presented great opportunities for the Reform movement. The proposals set forth by Ne'eman include some recognition of the movement, but without granting it the autonomy it really wishes. Conversion classes would be held jointly with the Orthodox, but the actual conversion process would be undertaken by an Orthodox bet din. The assumption is that the bet din would not inquire too deeply about the candidate's commitment to observance of an Orthodox lifestyle, but Reform movement leaders are unsure whether the Orthodox rabbinical establishment would accept this. Reform rabbis would be empowered to conduct weddings, but there would be two Orthodox witnesses sent by the rabbinate. Reform leaders ask what would happen if they tried to marry a kohen and a divorcee (a union proscribed by Orthodox halakhah), or a Reform convert from abroad, or if the rabbi was a woman. Ne'eman's intention is that Orthodox halakhah has to prevail, and that what he considers compromises are based on the Reform movement's acceptance of that premise. At this time, the Reform movement is adamantly opposed to accepting the principle of exclusivity contained in the proposals that would compel it to sacrifice its integrity.

As mentioned, the American Reform movement has accepted the Israeli position that the Israeli movement should be responsible for whatever decision is reached. Interviewees in Israel noted that the current leaders of American Reform are more personally committed to Israel and Zionism and more supportive of an independent Israel Reform movement than some past leaders.

Despite the independence of the Israel Reform movement, it is hard to envision that it will disregard the impact of any decision it reaches on foreign, and particularly American, Jewry. The fact is that the Israelis do call on American Jewry for support in their current struggle. Information regarding the status of the Reform movement in Israel, and the Conversion Bill in particular, is rapidly distributed via the Internet to subscribers of the ARZA news group. Material written by Rabbi Uri Regev for a report to the New Israel Fund, appropriate for a High Holiday sermon, was sent out on the ARZA user group prior to Rosh Hashanah (A disclaimer several days later pointed out that Rabbi Regev did not mind his publication being distributed, but that it was not done at his request.)

On the financial side, the New Israel Fund, which supports social justice causes in Israel, including advocacy for Ethiopian immigrants, women's rights, religious pluralism, and, specifically, the Israel Religious Action Center, reported a 20 percent increase in its contributions, ostensibly because of the Conversion Bill.52 The United Jewish Appeal announced that for the first time it would make a special allocation of $10 million from supplemental funds to each of the non-Orthodox movements in Israel, and that it would also make an effort to have the Jewish Agency allocate funds to the movements, in order to dampen the anger of American Jews following the first reading of the Conversion Bill.53 These funds would be based on supplemental contributions specifically earmarked for the movements. This means that an individual could make a contribution to the UJA/Federation that would go into its general coffers and be distributed regularly, and then the person could make an additional contribution earmarked for the denomination. (The Orthodox have since been included in this arrangement, so that the total supplemental fund project now stands at $30 million.)

As mentioned above, some Reform leaders fear that the attachment of Reform Jews to Israel is weak, and that hearing their leaders denounce Israel will further alienate them from Israel (and perhaps even from Judaism). Some leaders, particularly Rabbi Richard Hirsch, want the movement to accept the Ne'eman suggestions in order to ensure the continuity of klal yisrael and to keep the Jewish state alive. Rabbi Hirsch explains that the Reform movement should be interested in ensuring that its conversions are accepted by all streams of Judaism, and not seek to follow a procedure that will be rejected by others. "My position," he says, "is a minority position [within Reform], but it is that the Jewish state comes first, and Jewish rights come before human rights."

Some Israeli political leaders also fear that decreased Ameri-can Jewish support for Israel caused by the religious struggle in Israel can lead the U.S. government to conclude that American Jewish support for Israel in general is considerably attenuated. Their fear is that American Jews will no longer support and lobby on behalf of Israel as intensely as they did in the past. Reduction of domestic pressure can alter the way the United States formulates its policies toward Israel. This issue was raised in the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset.54

The issues dealt with by the Ne'eman committee are still to be resolved, but a precedent has been established in the creation of an official forum for discussion between the Orthodox and the non-Orthodox leaders. In itself, the Ne'eman committee symbolizes a degree of recognition for the movement. Failure to work out a compromise now in the committee may lead to greater polarization, especially if the Conversion Bill is passed. The Reform movement is still not obtaining the political support in Israel that it needs for its recognition, and more importantly, it also lacks the active mass support of the Israeli public. Israeli public opinion polls tend to indicate that non-Orthodox Jews are not against the movement and, in principle, would even agree to the movement's rabbis being granted equal rights. But the general public does not take an active stand on this--it is a silent majority. The greatest support that the Israel Reform movement has received during the Ne'eman committee deliberations has come from the movement in the United States.

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