December 6, 2006

Crucial decisions by the Israeli government on matters of life and death-war, security, and possible progress toward peace-are almost always attended by bitter controversy: Internal divisions, ideological imperatives, and varying readings of the existing situation come to light, not to mention personal ambitions and animosities. This was true all the more so this week, as Israelis (and others) tried to come to grips with the broad meaning of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's decision to sustain and even extend the ceasefire with the Palestinians. He held on to this decision, despite periodic breaches by the Palestinians-and very much against the advise of his senior military officers, who made it clear that they would obey political authority but fear the consequences of letting Hamas "off the hook" at this stage. They fear that Hamas will use the lull to rebuild its positions, strengthen itself in Gaza, and perhaps prepare the terror networks in the West Bank for the resumption of full-scale hostilities.
 
The debate in the Israeli Cabinet was sharp; its consequences will continue to echo. In effect, Olmert chose to gamble-not with the country's future (he believes, with good justification, that Israel remains very strong, vis-à-vis the Palestinians, and they would be badly advised if they read this as a sign of weakness), but certainly with the legitimacy and political survivability of his own government. If things go wrong, the remaining vestiges of his authority will be lost, and there will be little choice but to go to early elections, quite possibly leading to a complete realignment of Israeli politics and the disintegration of the "centrist experiment" launched by Ariel Sharon and Olmert.
 
Why take such risks? Beyond the immediate implications of the hostage situation in which Israel is caught-with Gil'ad Shalit, the residents of S'derot, and our neighboring Palestinian civilian population all held hostage by the radicals, sharing an urgent need to find a way out of their predicament-there are two key imperatives driving Olmert's choices:

• In general terms-strategically, or rather, more broadly, concerning his vision of Israel's future-his message is that the time has come to shake off the psychological and political effects of the violence following the Disengagement and of the Lebanon War, and return, as he did in the S'de Boker speech at David Ben-Gurion's grave, to the basic verities as he sees them. (Again and again, the "Ben-Gurionization" of former Likud leaders emerges as an underlying theme in the creation of Kadima as a centrist party.) Israel must find a way toward a two-state solution if it wants to survive and prosper as a highly developed, modern Jewish state; if it wants to continue to live, to use shorthand, on Warren Buffet's planet, not on Ahmadinejad's. The prospects for progress in that direction must be kept alive, not to satisfy the Palestinians, nor to appease vitriolic critics such as former President Jimmy Carter, but because this is in the long-term interests of Israel and the Jewish people. The majority of Israelis might reject a return to the "Green Line" (and are likely to resent the initiative of Education Minister Yuli Tamir in bringing it back to the schoolbook maps, which will run into insurmountable problems when it comes to Jerusalem, for example). But an even greater majority of Israelis, with the exception of the Far Right and the Far Left, support today some version of partition, which assumes the emergence of a Palestinian state, with temporary (the Road Map's Stage II) or permanent (Stage III) borders. Olmert is now bidding his future on his ability to show them that he can generate some movement in that direction.
  
  
• On a much more immediate and practical level, Olmert is sending a signal to the international community-and, in particular, to Washington, preempting the possible impact of the Baker-Hamilton recommendations. Israel feels bound to take into consideration the U.S. administration's real need for a period of relative stability, perhaps even progress, on the Israeli-Palestinian front, while President George W. Bush-given the new political realities- works to redefine goals and strategies in Iraq and to create a regional and international front (at the urging of Saudi Arabia, among others, not just Israel!) against the rising Iranian threat. The absolute centrality of the latter requires a proper reordering of priorities, in Israel as elsewhere. There should be no illusions. A breakthrough toward a permanent peace agreement is extremely unlikely, certainly as long as Hamas remains a dominant player. "Engagement" with Iran and Syria can only lead-and quickly-to a crisis. Syrian demands will include the Golan in full and control in Lebanon, implying international acquiescence in the murders of former Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri, of Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel, and others. Iranian demands, in the era of Ahmadinejad, would also include condoning murder (not only the AMIA bombing, but the harrowing persecution, bordering on genocide, of its Baha'i minority); recognition of Iran's dominant regional role; and, above all, a free ticket to military nuclear capability. Since neither set of demands can be met by the U.S., it is probably wiser not to embark on an exercise in futility. But on a much more modest level, it is not illogical for the U.S. to expect some "give" from Israel at this stage-in the form of a stable ceasefire-nor is it necessarily an act of weakness on Olmert's part to respond to this expectation.

This does create, however, an Israeli claim on American and international attitudes, if (as well may happen) the ceasefire collapses and all will depend upon a stern and extensive response to Palestinian provocations. Even more important will be the course charted in the next few months on Iran. If the risks presently taken by Israel do not help, at the end of the day, in producing a firm international commitment to stop the Iranian nuclear drive in its tracks, the political-and strategic-fallout will be severe and long-lasting.