

AJC SERIES ON TERRORISM



HAMAS

THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE
MOVEMENT OF PALESTINE

YEHUDIT BARSKY

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

HAMAS: THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT OF PALESTINE

YEHUDIT BARSKY

The American Jewish Committee protects the rights and freedoms of Jews the world over; combats bigotry and anti-Semitism and promotes human rights for all; works for the security of Israel and deepened understanding between Americans and Israelis; advocates public policy positions rooted in American democratic values and the perspectives of the Jewish heritage; and enhances the creative vitality of the Jewish people. Founded in 1906, it is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States.

To learn more about our mission, programs, and publications, and to join and contribute to our efforts, please visit us at www.ajc.org or contact us by phone at 212-751-4000 or by e-mail at contribute@ajc.org.

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Contents

Yehudit Barsky is the director of the Division on Middle East and International Terrorism of the American Jewish Committee and an associate scholar of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. She holds an M.A. in International Relations and Near Eastern Studies from New York University and is the author of a forthcoming book on Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as numerous monographs and articles. She is the executive editor of *Counterterrorism Watch*, a Web-based resource designed to inform and educate professionals and the general public about international terrorism and efforts to contain it.

Ms. Barsky's publications for the American Jewish Committee's Series on Terrorism include *Hizballah: A Mega-Terrorist Organization*, *The New Leadership of Hamas: A Profile of Khalid Al-Mish`al*; *Al-Qa`ida, Iran and Hizballah—A Continuing Symbiosis*; *Hizballah—The "Party of God," `Usama Bin Ladin and Al-Qa`ida, The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine*, and *The Brooklyn Bridge Shooting: An Independent Review and Analysis*.

Copyright © 2006 American Jewish Committee
All Rights Reserved.
Publication date: May 2006

Hamas—The Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine	1
The Emblem of Hamas	3
Origins	4
Ideology	5
Methodology: Da'awa and Jihad	9
Hamas's Designation as a Terrorist Organization	12
Current Leadership	15
The Growing Prominence of the Hamas Political Bureau	19
International Funds and Assistance to Hamas	20
Iran and Hamas	21
Financial Support from Abroad: Saudi Arabia and Gulf States Funding	24
Funding from Western Europe	30
Activities in the U.S.	32
Saddam Hussein's Support of Hamas	35
Hamas and Al-Qa`ida	35
Hamas and Fatah	37
Hamas's Victory in the Palestinian Elections: "Islam Is the Solution"	38
Notes	42

Hamas—The Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine

For our struggle against the Jews is extremely wide-ranging and grave, so much so that it will need all the loyal efforts we can wield, to be followed by further steps and reinforced by successive battalions from the multifarious Arab and Islamic world, until the enemies are defeated and Allah's victory prevails.¹

Introduction to “The Charter of Allah: The Platform of Hamas”

We cannot recognize Israel. The land of Palestine is ours and not for the Jews.²

Hamas's Yusuf Rizka, Palestinian Authority Minister of Information, March 2006

We say to this West, which does not act reasonably, and does not learn its lessons: By Allah, you will be defeated. You will be defeated in Palestine, and your defeat there has already begun. True, it is Israel that is being defeated there, but when Israel is defeated, its path is defeated, those who call to support it are defeated, and the cowards who hide behind it and support it are defeated. Israel will be defeated, and so will whoever supported or supports it.³

Sermon of Hamas leader Khalid Al-Mish`al at Al-Murabit Mosque in Damascus, February 2006

Palestine means Palestine in its entirety from the [Mediterranean] Sea to the [Jordan] River, from Ra's Al-Naqura to Rafah. We cannot give up a single inch of it. Therefore, we will not recognize the Israeli enemy's [right] to a single inch.⁴

Mahmud Al-Zahar, leader of Hamas in Gaza, on Hizballah's Al-Manar television, January 2006

*Despite all the pressure, the Palestinians have become more determined in their struggles, and Hamas will never give up its fundamental strategy, which is resistance. We will not be satisfied with anything less than the Zionists' withdrawal from all of the occupied territories and, as the late Imam Khomeini said, Israel is a deadly tumor which we will never recognize as a state.*⁵

Hamas leader Khalid Al-Mish'al at a meeting with Iranian president Mahmud Ahmadinejad, December 2005

*The Americans and the Europeans say to Hamas: Either you have weapons or you enter the legislative council. We say [we will have] weapons and the legislative council, there is no contradiction between the two.*⁶

Isma'il Haniya, lead Hamas candidate in Palestinian elections, January 2006 (prime minister as of February 2006)

*She [Hamas suicide bomber Reem Al-Riyashi] is not going to be the last because the march of resistance will continue until the Islamic flag is raised, not only over the minarets of Jerusalem, but over the whole universe.*⁷

Mahmud Al-Zahar, Hamas leader in Gaza, January 2004

*Hamas is a jihadi (fighting for a holy purpose) movement in the broad sense of the word jihad. It is part of the Islamic awakening movement and upholds that this awakening is the road which will lead to the liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea.*⁸

The Islamic Resistance Movement—Hamas official Web site

Hamas, which won a majority of seats in the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, is an Islamic extremist terror organization that calls for the eradication of Israel through acts of violence that are legitimized through a radical interpretation of Islamic theology. Hamas is the Arabic acronym for *Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya fi Filistin*, or the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine. Its goal is to replace Israel with a militant Palestinian Islamic state.

The Emblem of Hamas



Official emblem of the Hamas movement⁹

*Love of martyrdom is something deep inside the heart. The only aim is to win Allah's satisfaction. That can be done in the simplest and speediest manner by dying in the cause of Allah. And it is Allah who selects the martyrs.*¹⁰

Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, founder of Hamas

The emblem of Hamas illustrates the ideology and goals of the movement. Central to the emblem is the depiction of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem with Palestinian flags arrayed in semicircles on either side. The flag on the right side bears the first half of the Muslim confession of faith in Arabic: "*La ilaha ila Allah*"—"There is no other deity but God," and the flag on the left is inscribed with the second half: "*Muhammad rasul Allah*"—"Muhammad is the Messenger of God."

At the pinnacle of the Al-Aqsa Mosque is Hamas's vision of "Palestine"—a map that encompasses all of the territory that is now Israel as well as the Palestinian Authority-controlled areas of the West Bank and Gaza. Superimposed over the Al-Aqsa Mosque are two crossed swords that represent the jihad, or holy war, which is central to the tenets of Hamas ideology. Below the crossed swords is the inscription *Filistin-Palestine*, and the lower half of the emblem bears a white semicircular banner with the full Arabic name of the movement, *Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya-the Islamic Resistance Movement*, and its Arabic acronym, *Hamas*, which is also the Arabic word for "zeal."

Origins

*We believe there is no substitute for the path of jihad for liberation.*¹¹

Communiqué No. 34 issued by the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas

Hamas is a creation of the Palestinian branch of the extremist Muslim Brotherhood movement. The organization was created in 1988 by the late Sheikh Ahmad Yassin,¹² the Hamas ideologue and founder who was then a preacher of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood movement in Gaza. In concurrence with his teachings, Yassin and his followers formed Hamas as the “military wing” of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood.

Initially, the founders of Hamas were members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and ultimately all of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood’s organizations and institutions were absorbed into the infrastructure of Hamas. In January 1991¹³ the “Iz Al-Din Al-Qassam Battalions” emerged as Hamas’s “military wing.” The Battalions were named after the Syrian Islamic extremist preacher Sheikh `Iz Al-Din Al-Qassam. During the 1920s Al-Qassam preached in favor of jihad and organizing an armed revolt against then French-controlled Syria. He fled Syria for Haifa in British-controlled Mandatory Palestine in 1922, where he continued to preach and organize an armed revolt against the British. Al-Qassam was killed in a battle with British forces in 1935.¹⁴ The estimated number of Hamas’s Al-Qassam Battalions terrorist operatives is reported to be between 1,000 to 1,500 men.¹⁵

The movement’s August 1988 covenant interprets the Islamic theological concept of jihad as “holy war” and calls for the obliteration of Israel through militant action. Its ultimate goal is the establishment of an Islamic radical state in place of Israel.¹⁶ In 1988, Sheikh Bassam Jarrar, a Muslim Brotherhood preacher and prominent leader of Hamas, articulated the vision of his movement: the conquest of all of the territory of what is now Israel, as well as the West Bank and Gaza from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. Thereafter, Hamas would conquer the entire world.¹⁷

Ideology



Adaptation of Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood symbol with Hamas inscription, 1988¹⁸

Allah is our objective.

The Messenger¹⁹ is our leader.

Qur'an is our law.

Jihad is our way.

*Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.*²⁰

Official slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood

The Slogan of the Islamic Resistance Movement:

*Allah is its target, the Prophet is its model, the Qur'an its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes.*²¹

Article Eight, official English version of the Hamas Covenant

The Hamas movement began as an ideological offshoot and the military wing of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, which was part of the international Muslim Brotherhood movement founded by Hassan Al-Banna in Egypt in 1928. Hamas continues to view itself as part of the larger Muslim Brotherhood movement as indicated in Article Two of the 1988 Hamas Covenant: “The Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas] is one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times.”²²

The official English translation of the Hamas Covenant is emblazoned with two symbols representing Hamas. One is the present symbol of Hamas depicting the Al-Aqsa Mosque in use today. The other incorporates the symbol of the Muslim Brotherhood, indicating the movement’s origins. The symbol of the Muslim

Brotherhood movement, which consists of a Qur'an with crossed swords beneath it, is encircled by Palestinian flags on either side. Below the flags in a semicircle is the full name of Hamas—*Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya*—the Islamic Resistance Movement.²³

While the Muslim Brotherhood movement, like Hamas, interprets the Islamic theological concept of jihad as “holy war,” it envisions the time for such a war to be at the end of days. At that time, a pan-Islamic state will be established that will be based on its ideologues' radical interpretation of *shari'a*, or Islamic law.

Hamas is more militant than the Brotherhood and departs from its ideology in its interpretation that the time for jihad, or holy war, is in the present. It is also more decidedly Palestinian nationalist in character and views itself as being at the forefront of Palestinian efforts to fight against Israel and, ultimately, destroy it.

The Hamas Covenant declares:

The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the links in the chain of the struggle against the Zionist invaders. It goes back to 1939, to the emergence of the martyr `Iz Al-Din Al-Qassam and his brethren the fighters, members of Muslim Brotherhood [sic]. It goes on to reach out and become one with another chain that includes the struggle of the Palestinians and Muslim Brotherhood in the 1948 war and the jihad operations of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1968 and after.²⁴

In consonance with the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb in his radical commentary on the Qur'an, *Fi Thilal Al-Qur'an (In the Shade of the Qur'an)*, and in his political tract, *Marakatuna ma'a Al-Yahud (Our Struggle with the Jews)*, Hamas views the Muslim world as being in a state of severe crisis caused by the westernization of the Middle East. Western influence, represented by Israel, is therefore the most formidable enemy facing the Muslim world today. Hamas also shares the view that a state of war has existed between Muslims on the one side and Christians and Jews on the other since the founding of Islam in the seventh century. Qutb, referring to the Christians and Jews as the “enemies” of the Muslim world, writes:

The war against Islam started 1,400 years ago, when Muslims established their state in Madinah, and became distinguished by their character and firmly established the roots of their independence in faith, concept, and political system. The enemies will never stop waging this war unless they achieve their goal of turning Muslims away from their faith, so that they become non-Muslims.²⁵ [Emphasis added.]

In a departure from the view of mainstream Islam, which accepts Jews as fellow believers in monotheism, Hamas espouses a theological anti-Semitism that regards Israel and Jews as an embodiment of evil in the world that will, in time, be destroyed as part of the Divine plan. The Hamas Covenant explains:

[T]he Islamic Resistance Movement aspires to the realization of Allah's promise, no matter how long that should take. The Prophet, Allah bless him and grant him salvation, has said: “The Day of Judgment will not come about until Muslims fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say, ‘O Muslims, O Abdallah [servant of God], there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.’ Only the Gharqad tree [evidently a certain kind of tree] would not do that because it is one of the trees of the Jews.”²⁶

The Hamas Covenant also borrows its depiction of Jews as seeking world domination from the infamous anti-Semitic tract *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Article Twenty-Two of the Covenant states:

The enemies have been scheming for a long time, and they have consolidated their schemes, in order to achieve what they have achieved. They took advantage of key elements in unfolding events, and accumulated a huge and influential material wealth which they put to the service of implementing their dream. This wealth [permitted them to] take over control of the world media such as news agencies, the press, publication houses, broadcasting and the like. [They also used this] wealth to stir revolution in various parts of the globe in order to fulfill their interests and pick the fruits. [sic]

The article continues:

They stood behind the French and the Communist Revolutions and behind most of the revolutions we hear about here and there. They also used the money to establish clandestine organizations which are spreading around the world, in order to destroy societies and carry out Zionist interests. Such organizations are: the Free Masons, Rotary Clubs, Lions Clubs, B'nai B'rith and the like. All of them are destructive spying organizations. They also used the money to take over control of the Imperialist states and made them colonize many countries in order to exploit the wealth of those countries and spread their corruption therein.²⁷

Hamas, like its precursor, the Muslim Brotherhood, views Jews and Christians as “infidels” or “disbelievers,” or enemies of the Divine revelation received by Muhammad.²⁸ In time, however, the “disbelievers” will be vanquished in a cataclysmic war, or jihad, which will result in the victory of the Muslim forces. As an example of this attitude, Hamas leader Sheikh Bassam Jarrar has denounced all religions—with the exception of Islam—as false.²⁹

Hamas continues to rely upon the support, writings, and teachings of Muslim Brotherhood ideologues. Muhammad Aqef, the current supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, issued a ruling in 2004 that called upon all of the branches of the Brotherhood throughout the world to commit themselves to the struggle against Israel.³⁰ Since 1994, Hamas has built a cult of legitimacy surrounding its suicide bombings, despite the fact that mainstream Islam forbids suicide. It cites the *fatwa*, or Islamic theological ruling, of Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, a well-known ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, who legitimizes suicide bombings via his own radical interpretation of Islamic theology.

Al-Qaradhawi's extremist theological rulings are prominently featured on the official Arabic Internet site of Hamas, the Palestinian Information Center (PIC), or, as it is known in Arabic, *Al-Markaz Al-Filistini lil' ilam*.³¹ Al-Qaradhawi's original *fatwa* on suicide bombings is entitled, “Hamas Operations Are Jihad and Those Who [Carry It Out and] Are Killed Are Considered Martyrs.”³² Using Al-Qaradhawi's ruling to legitimize the violent activities of

Hamas, the *fatwa* was listed on the Web site under the title “The Islamic Theological Origins of the Palestinian Resistance.”³³

In December 2001 Al-Qaradhawi elaborated on his stance regarding suicide bombings by articulating the position that there are no innocent Israeli civilians: “In Israel, all men and women are soldiers. They are all occupying troops.”³⁴ Hamas leader Isma'il Abu Shanab echoed Al-Qaradhawi's assessment: “In our view, there is not a single person in Israel whom we don't view as a usurper of our land,”³⁵ and, therefore, a target for acts of violence carried out by Hamas.

Following the lead of Al-Qaradhawi,³⁶ the Hamas movement does not refer to operatives who carry out suicide bombings as a “suicides”; instead, it refers to them as *shuhada'*, or “martyrs,” and to the suicide bombings as *'amaliyat al-istishadiya*—“acts of martyrdom” or “martyrdom operations.” Hamas lauds its operatives who carry out such attacks and provides them with full Muslim burial rites. The movement also provides for the material needs of the suicide bomber's family.

Other *fatwas* by Qaradhawi on the Hamas Web site include: *Shari'a al-amaliyat al-istishadiya fi Filistin al-muhtala*—“The *Shari'a* of Martyrdom Operations in Occupied Palestine,”³⁷ and *Fatwa al-'ulama Al-duktur Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi hawla musharaka al-nisa' fi al-'amaliyat al-istishadiya*—“*Fatwa* of the Islamic Scholar Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi on the Participation of Women in Martyrdom Operations.”³⁸ Hamas leaders have also published their own *fatwas* endorsing suicide bombings, which are featured on the Hamas Web site. These include a *fatwa* by Sheikh Ahmad Bahr entitled *Makanat Al-shuhada' fi Al-Islam*—“The Place of Martyrs in Islam.”³⁹

Methodology: Da'awa and Jihad

The world has to understand such operations are not suicide bombings. They are martyrdom operations. These are the most honorable and precious of sacrifices for achieving national and religious goals to end Palestinian suffering. They are justified by our religious scholars, and I think they are very effective in convincing the

*Israelis that their existence as an occupying power cost them too much. We are an occupied people; we have to continue our armed struggle by all means to resist occupation.*⁴⁰

Hamas leader in Gaza Mahmud Al-Zahar

*We are ready to offer 1,000, 2,000, or even 10,000 martyrs every year. We are ready to keep offering martyrs for twenty years because we are sure we are moving in the right direction and that we will prevail in the end.*⁴¹

Hamas leader Khalid Al-Mish'al

*The children of the kindergarten are the shabeeds (martyrs) of tomorrow.*⁴²

Slogan displayed on a poster in a Hamas-run kindergarten

*Holy war is our way.
Death for God is our highest wish.*⁴³

Poster displayed in a Hamas kindergarten

Hamas recruits activists to its ranks through the medium of *da'awa*, nonviolent ideological indoctrination that takes place in mosques, schools, and other social institutions. Mirroring the methodology of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas continues to indoctrinate its followers via its religious and social institutions, which include clinics, orphanages, colleges, summer camps, and sports clubs. Attendees of programs at these institutions receive social welfare services that are accompanied by presentations designed to indoctrinate them ideologically into the belief system of Hamas. The social institutions of Hamas thus provide a constant source of indoctrination across all levels of Palestinian society. As a result of this activity, the recruitment of suicide bombers has taken place at colleges, sports clubs, mosques, and other institutions sponsored by the organization.⁴⁴ The senior Hamas leader in the West Bank town of Ramallah, Hassan Yusuf, commented on the phenomenon by stating, "We like to grow them—from kindergarten through college."⁴⁵

Suicide bombers are recruited for the 'Iz Al-Din Al-Qassam Battalions of Hamas based on their religious fervor and clean crimi-

nal record. At any one time, it is estimated that Hamas has prepared between five and twenty young men, generally ranging in age from their late teens to mid-thirties, who have completed their training to carry out suicide attacks.⁴⁶ Most of them are graduates of colleges or universities.⁴⁷

The matériel required for a suicide bomber to carry out an attack is relatively simple. It includes: the cost of tailoring a custom-fit belt wide enough to hold six or eight pockets full of explosives, and the explosive device itself, which consists of nails, gunpowder, mercury, acetone, a battery, an electrical switch, and a short cable. The largest expense item is providing transportation to an Israeli venue of the bombing. The total cost of a single suicide bombing is approximately \$142.⁴⁸ Following the attack, Hamas provides for the material needs of the bomber's family by giving each family between \$2,800 and \$5,000.⁴⁹

The suicide bombers are promised that the first drop of blood shed by a "martyr" when he carries out his act of jihad instantaneously cleanses him of sin. On the Day of Judgment, he will face no reckoning, and, on the Day of Resurrection, he will be able to intercede for seventy of his relatives to enter Heaven; and he will have at his disposal seventy-two *huris*, the beautiful black-eyed virgins of Paradise.⁵⁰ He is also told that his family will be provided for.⁵¹

Hamas leader Isma'il Abu-Shanab explains the ideological motivation for the organization's suicide bombing attacks in the following manner: "Patriotism motivates and religion teaches you not to be afraid; it tells you that your soul will achieve happiness." When he was asked whether the bombers are promised a place in Paradise, he responded: "That is part of the Islamic belief, that those who sacrifice themselves in God's name will be rewarded. If you dream of a beautiful woman, you will have one."⁵²

Throughout its history, Hamas has carried out acts of violence against Israeli civilians and soldiers, including suicide bombings, car bombings, kidnappings, drive-by shootings, and stabbing attacks. From September 2000 to early 2004, Hamas carried out 425 terror-

ist attacks of various kinds against Israel. As a result, 377 Israeli civilians and soldiers were killed and 2,076 were wounded.⁵³

Thus far, the weapons that Hamas has used include, for the most part, conventional weapons: hand grenades, Kalashnikov rifles, belts packed with explosives, and Qassam rockets. A recent assessment done by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service indicated that Hamas is reportedly developing more sophisticated explosive charges in order to carry out larger attacks aimed at buildings, and is believed to be experimenting with explosive charges in order to disperse chemical materials.⁵⁴ More recently, Hamas is reported to be developing biological and chemical weapons.⁵⁵

The movement initiated its use of suicide bombings in Israeli population centers in 1994. During the period of September 2000 to April 2004, Hamas carried out 53 suicide bombing attacks that caused the deaths of 289 Israelis and injured 1,649.⁵⁶ Hamas communiqués claiming responsibility for suicide bombings and other attacks are catalogued on the official Internet site of the movement, the Palestine Information Center, in Arabic in a document entitled *Sijil Al-Majid*—“The Record of Glory.”⁵⁷ The terrorists who carry out the attacks are referred to as *shuhada’* or “martyrs,” and the movement publishes a memorial page for each of them on its Web site in a section entitled *Shuhada’ wa mu`ataqalun*—“Martyrs and Prisoners.”⁵⁸

Hamas’s Designation as a Terrorist Organization

*We will not give up the resistance in the sense of jihad, martyrdom-seeking, sacrifices, arrests, the demolition of homes, and the uprooting of trees, at the same time, nor the shattering of the Israeli enemy’s honor in all the confrontations—the war of tunnels and of security against the Israeli enemy, which ultimately led to its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and part of the West Bank.*⁵⁹

Mahmud Al-Zahar, leader of Hamas in Gaza, on Hizballah’s Al-Manar TV, January 2006

One year after the official emergence of Hamas, the movement was designated as an illegal terrorist organization by the government of

Israel in September 1989.⁶⁰ Hamas was designated as a terrorist organization on January 23, 1995, by then President Bill Clinton in Executive Order 12947.⁶¹ Following the 1996 passage of the Antiterrorism Act, the U.S. State Department designated Hamas as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.⁶² After the September 11 attacks, Hamas was added to the U.S. Treasury Department’s list of Specially Designated Global Terrorist organizations on November 2, 2001.⁶³ On December 22, 2003, the European Union designated Hamas as a terrorist organization.⁶⁴

On December 4, 2001, the U.S. Treasury designated three entities “that provide financial and material support to Hamas” as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). Included among the organizations was the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) of Richardson, Texas, which was originally known as the Occupied Land Fund. Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzuq provided a significant amount of funds to the HLF during the early 1990s and designated the group as “the primary fundraising entity for Hamas in the United States.”⁶⁵

Initially, the Occupied Land Fund was established in California in 1989. Three years later, it relocated to Texas and opened offices in California, Illinois, and New Jersey, with representatives throughout the United States. Other representatives of the organization operated in the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, two Hamas financial institutions located in the West Bank and Gaza, Al-Aqsa Islamic Bank and Beit El-Mal Holdings, were also designated as SDGTs.⁶⁶

In May 2003 the U.S. Treasury designated the Al-Aqsa Foundation in Aachen, Germany, as an SDGT that “funnels funds—including money donated for charitable purposes—to the militant terrorist group Hamas.” The Al-Aqsa Foundation’s offices are located in Rotterdam, Holland; Copenhagen, Denmark; Brussels, Belgium; Malmo, Sweden; Johannesburg, South Africa; San`a, Yemen; and Islamabad, Pakistan.⁶⁷

Six Hamas leaders were also designated as SDGTs by the U.S. Treasury at that time. They included Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, then the leader of Hamas in Gaza, who, according to the U.S. Treasury

Department, maintained “a direct line of communication with other Hamas leaders on coordination of Hamas’s military activities and openly admit[ted] that there is no distinguishing the political and military wings of Hamas.”⁶⁸

The others were Khalid Al-Mish`al, then head of the Hamas Political Bureau and Executive Committee and today the leader of the movement; Imad Khalil Al-`Alami, a member of the Hamas Political Bureau operating in Damascus, Syria; `Usama Hamdan, a senior Hamas leader in Lebanon; `Abd Al-`Aziz Al-Rantisi, then a Hamas leader in Gaza reporting to Sheikh Yassin; and Musa Abu Marzuq, deputy chief of the Hamas Political Bureau, operating in Damascus, Syria. Abu Marzuq was previously designated as a Specially Designated Terrorist by the U.S. Treasury on August 29, 1995.⁶⁹

Five charities that provide support to Hamas and are part of the organization’s funding infrastructure in Europe were also designated. They include Commite de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens (CBSP) in France; a Swiss affiliate of the CBSP, the Association de Secours Palestinien (ASP); Interpal, or the Palestinian Relief and Development Fund, based in the United Kingdom; and Sanabil Association for Relief and Development, based in Lebanon.⁷⁰

Most recently, on February 19, 2006, the U.S. Treasury froze the assets of KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development, a nonprofit organization operating out of Toledo, Ohio.⁷¹ In late December 2003, KindHearts was reported to be providing funds to Hamas institutions and other Islamic extremist groups located in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.⁷²

KindHearts was established in 2002 to replace the activities of three other Muslim charities that had been closed down as the result of their ties to terrorist activities. The charities included the Holy Land Foundation, the Global Relief Foundation, and Benevolence International.⁷³ In 2004, its second year of operation, KindHearts raised \$5.1 million.⁷⁴ According to the Treasury Department, “KindHearts officials and fundraisers have coordinated with Hamas leaders and made contributions to Hamas affiliated organizations.”⁷⁵

Current Leadership



Khalid Al-Mish`al—Leader of Hamas

*You must understand: Liberation of the territories from the occupation is only one phase.... We do not distinguish between Palestine of 1948 and Palestine of 1967. Palestine is everything.*⁷⁶

Hamas leader Khalid Al-Mish`al

Following Israel’s targeted assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, Hamas’s present leader, Khalid Al-Mish`al, was appointed the new head of Hamas on March 24, 2004, in Damascus, Syria. He directs Hamas’s activities from Damascus. Two days after his appointment, Al-Mish`al demonstrated his movement’s fealty to Yassin’s vision of the organization by reaffirming its central tenet—the destruction of Israel via a holy war or jihad. In remarks to a demonstration of 5,000 Palestinians in Ramallah, broadcast to the crowd via telephone, Al-Mish`al declared: “Hamas is in good health and will continue its jihad and resistance. We will continue our sacrifices until the end of the occupation.”⁷⁷ The demonstrators responded with chants of “Death to Israel! Death to Israel!”⁷⁸

Al-Mish`al was born in 1956 in the village of Silwad, then under Jordanian rule. Following the 1967 war, when Silwad came under Israeli sovereignty, Al-Mish`al and his family moved to Kuwait to join his father, who had gone there for employment several years earlier.⁷⁹

Al-Mish`al completed his primary education at the Khalid Bin Walid School and the Al-Hariri Complementary School and his secondary education at the Abdallah Al-Salim High School in Kuwait.⁸⁰ Like all of the Hamas founders, Al-Mish`al was initially a Muslim Brotherhood activist. He became a follower of the organization and officially joined the movement in 1971 at the age of fifteen.⁸¹

Continuing his involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood, he headed a student organization at Kuwait University called the “List

of the Islamic Right.”⁸² He received a degree in physics from Kuwait University in 1978⁸³ and lived in Kuwait until 1990. Following Kuwait’s expulsion of all Palestinians from that country as retribution for their support of Saddam Hussein’s 1990 occupation of Kuwait, Al-Mish`al and his family left for Jordan.⁸⁴ Al-Mish`al was expelled from Jordan in 1999 and presently directs Hamas activities from Damascus.

Isma’il Haniya—Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority



*We were born from the womb of resistance; we will protect the resistance and the arm of resistance will not be touched.*⁸⁵

*[One] of the signs of victory is the Palestinian mother who prepares her son to be a warrior and then receives the news of his death for the sake of Allah with cries of happiness.*⁸⁶

*Hamas do[es] not believe in the existence of Israel.*⁸⁷

*Hamas is loyal to the blood of its martyrs and will continue on the path of holy war and resistance until we achieve victory by defeating the Zionists.*⁸⁸

*All of Palestine will turn into a volcano that will burn up the enemies.*⁸⁹

Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Isma’il Haniya

Isma’il Abd Al-Salam Ahmad Haniya, the new prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, was born in 1963 in Al-Shati’ refugee camp⁹⁰ in Egypt-controlled Gaza. He received a bachelor’s degree in Arabic literature from the Islamic University in Gaza in 1987.⁹¹ At the university Haniya became involved in Islamist activities. In 1983 and 1984 he was active on the student council of the university, and during the academic year of 1985-86, he served as the leader of the student council. During that period of time he developed a close relationship with Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, then the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, affiliated with Al-Mujamma Al-Islami, the Islamic Assembly.⁹²

During the Palestinian uprising that began in 1987, Haniya was appointed as the Hamas representative to the high Palestinian monitoring committee that directed the intifada. As a result of his activities, Haniya was arrested and detained three times by Israeli security forces between 1987 and 1989.⁹³ The third time that he was arrested, on May 18, 1989, Haniya was detained for three years. He was released in May of 1992. In December 1992 Haniya was deported to Marj Al-Zuhur in southern Lebanon, together with other Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders. One year later, Haniya returned to Gaza.⁹⁴

Haniya remained a close associate of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. He became a prominent leader of Hamas after he was appointed as the director of Yassin’s office⁹⁵ in 1998⁹⁶ and served in that position until Yassin’s death in 2004. Ultimately, Haniya was appointed as a member of Hamas’s high committee for dialogue with other Palestinian organizations⁹⁷ and became Hamas’s representative to the Palestinian Authority.⁹⁸ During the January election campaign, Haniya appeared in election commercials on behalf of Hamas.⁹⁹

On March 28, 2006, Haniya and his cabinet were approved by the Palestinian parliament in a vote of 71 to 36. On the same day, Haniya and a group of other Hamas cabinet ministers prayed at the home of Hamas’s founder and ideologue, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. Haniya told Yassin’s wife, “We are coming to congratulate you and to say that the blood of our sheikh [Yassin] did not go in vain.”¹⁰⁰ Despite his ascension to the premiership of the Palestinian Authority, Haniya is still considered second in the Hamas hierarchy to Mahmud Al-Zahar, the Gaza leader of Hamas who is now foreign minister of the Palestinian Authority.



Mahmud Al-Zahar—Foreign Minister of the Palestinian Authority

*History proves that this is the land of the Palestinian people and we will never give up any part of it. If our generation will not succeed to liberate all of historical Palestine, then that mission will be for the following generations.*¹⁰¹

*Oslo is not only dead, it has rotted.*¹⁰²

*Negotiation is not our aim. Negotiation is a missile.*¹⁰³

*I don't trust the term "moderate." We are already moderate. But if people believe we will be moderate in the Western style, or a pro-Israeli style—that's not moderate. That's corruption.*¹⁰⁴

Mahmud Al-Zahar, Hamas leader in Gaza

Mahmud Khalid Al-Zahar is foreign minister in the Palestinian cabinet. He is also the leader of Hamas in Gaza. Al-Zahar is one of the founders of Hamas and served as Sheikh Ahmad Yassin's personal physician. Since the death of Sheikh Yassin in 2004, Al-Zahar has been considered part of Hamas's "collective leadership," which consists of Al-Zahar, Haniya, and Said Siyam.¹⁰⁵ Al-Zahar became Hamas's most prominent spokesman in Gaza, and until his appointment as foreign minister, he continued to give weekly sermons at a mosque in Gaza.¹⁰⁶

Al-Zahar was born in the Al-Zaytun district of Gaza City in 1945. He studied at `Ayn Shams University in Cairo, Egypt, graduated in 1971¹⁰⁷ with a medical degree, and remained in Cairo at the university for another five years to specialize in general surgery.¹⁰⁸ Al-Zahar returned to Gaza in 1976, where he became a lecturer at the department of medicine at the Islamic University of Gaza. At that time he joined the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁰⁹

In 1987 Al-Zahar became one of the founders of Hamas, together with Sheikh Yassin and `Abd Al-Aziz Al-Rantisi. Al-Zahar served as the organization's spokesman.¹¹⁰ In 1989 Sheikh Yassin was arrested by the Israeli authorities and tried for ordering the murder of Palestinians who had collaborated with Israel. Sheikh Yassin was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Together with Al-Rantisi, Al-Zahar took over the leadership of Hamas in Gaza. Subsequently, Al-Zahar became the unofficial representative of Hamas to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1990.¹¹¹ In September 2003, he survived a targeted assassination attempt by Israel when his house was bombed by the Israeli Air Force.

The Growing Prominence of the Hamas Political Bureau

Following Israel's arrest of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin in 1989, Hamas devised a strategy to ensure the continued operation of its leadership. Since the organization's establishment in 1987, Yassin had served as its leader and the central address for all of its activities. He received assistance from Muslim Brotherhood activists in Jordan and maintained ties with Musa Abu Marzuq, a close associate from the Muslim Brotherhood who had departed from Gaza to study for his Ph.D. in the United States in 1974.¹¹²

Yassin's involvement in every aspect of Hamas activities and his centralized control over a small, tightly knit organization were nearly the cause of its downfall. His arrest by Israeli authorities in 1989 demonstrated the full extent of his involvement in all aspects of the organization's activities. Yassin was charged with premeditated murder, possession of weapons, incitement, the illegal transfer of \$500,000, assisting the escape of two convicts from prison, recruiting members for Hamas, and membership in an illegal organization.¹¹³ In 1991, Yassin was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment plus fifteen years.¹¹⁴

The removal of Sheikh Yassin created a vacuum that temporarily destroyed the ability of Hamas to function. In his absence, the second tier of Hamas leadership, including individuals such as Ibrahim Ghawsha and `Imad Khalil Al-`Alami, who operated out of the Hamas office in Amman, Jordan, and Musa Abu Marzuq and Ahmad Bin Yusuf, who were living in the United States, rebuilt the organization's infrastructure. Abu Marzuq, one of the most senior leaders of Hamas abroad, became the acting leader of the movement and was appointed as the first chairman of the newly created Hamas Political Bureau in early 1991.¹¹⁵

The operations of the Hamas military wing, the `Iz Al-Din Al-Qassam Battalions, were transferred abroad to the responsibility of Abu Marzuq. From his home in Falls Church, Virginia, Abu Marzuq reinvigorated the activities of Hamas by selecting a new

leadership cadre in the West Bank and Gaza.¹¹⁶ He also directed the terror activities of the `Iz Al-Din Al-Qassam Battalions¹¹⁷ until his arrest in New York on terrorism charges in 1995.¹¹⁸

The current leader of Hamas, Khalid Al-Mish`al, also played a role in the metamorphosis of a new infrastructure for Hamas. Upon his arrival in Jordan in 1990, Al-Mish`al assumed responsibility for the international fundraising efforts of Hamas at the organization's office in Amman.¹¹⁹ After the arrest of Abu Marzuq in 1995, the fifty-member Hamas Consultative Council, or *Shura*, elected Al-Mish`al chairman of its Political Bureau,¹²⁰ but the official announcement of his appointment did not occur until eighteen months later, in December 1996.¹²¹ Taking over Abu Marzuq's organizational portfolio, Al-Mish`al also assumed responsibility for the terror activities of the `Iz Al-Din Al-Qassam Battalions, which were relocated to the Hamas offices in Amman, Jordan, in 1995.¹²²

Al-Mish`al was reelected political bureau chairman in March 2004.¹²³ Today the members of the Hamas Political Bureau include Abu Marzuq (who was deported by the U.S. to Jordan in 1997 and returned to resume his activities as the bureau's vice chairman), Ibrahim Al-Ghawshah, Imad Khalil Al-`Alami, Muhammad Al-Nazzal, Sami Khater, and `Izzat Rashaq.¹²⁴

From 1992 until 1999, Al-Mish`al led the Political Bureau from Amman, Jordan. He and three other Hamas representatives—Ibrahim Al-Ghawsha, Sami Khater, and `Izzat Rashaq¹²⁵—were expelled from Jordan¹²⁶ on August 31, 1999.¹²⁷ From then until 2001 Al-Mish`al divided his time between Doha, Qatar, and Damascus, Syria.¹²⁸ Since 2001, Al-Mish`al has directed the organization's activities from Hamas offices located in Damascus.¹²⁹

International Funds and Assistance to Hamas

Since its establishment in 1991, the Hamas Political Bureau has metamorphosed to take on the responsibility of providing logistics and funding for Hamas terror operations. It has also acted as the liaison of Hamas to the Muslim world. As Abu Marzuq's deputy during the mid-1990s, Al-Mish`al served as the Hamas liaison to Muslim and Arab organizations.

In December 1993 Al-Mish`al participated in the international Popular Arab and Islamic Conference held in Khartoum, Sudan, which assembled an opposition front of Islamist radicals and Arab Marxists to oppose the September 1993 Oslo Accords. The conference was organized and sponsored by the Islamist radical government of Sudan, led by Hassan Al-Turabi. As the Hamas representative to the conference, Al-Mish`al declared that only a jihad would win back Palestinian land.¹³⁰ Naif Hawatmeh, the chairman of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, declared, "To hell with the Oslo-Washington agreement! We hope the conference will send a clear message—no!"¹³¹

As an integral part of his efforts to garner support for Hamas, Al-Mish`al headed numerous Hamas delegations to Muslim countries that had extended financial support to Hamas. He also maintained the movement's strong ties to Iran by meeting regularly with Iranian leaders, including then Iranian president Muhammad Khatami. At a 1999 meeting with Al-Mish`al and other radical Palestinian opposition leaders, President Khatami pledged, "The Islamic Revolution and the people of Iran will be with you."¹³²

Iran and Hamas



Hamas leaders Khalid Al-Mish`al and Musa Abu Marzuq meeting with Iran's Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Sayyed `Ali Khamene`i

Since its founding, Hamas has received funding for its social institutions from various Middle Eastern governments and from private donors. Through the early liaison efforts of Musa Abu Marzuq and Khalid Al-Mish`al, Iran became one of the chief financial sponsors of Hamas. In 1993, Iran promised a budget of some \$30 million to Hamas.¹³³ A 1994 report indicated that Iran provided \$3 million a year to both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and one thou-

sand families of Palestinian suicide bombers or detainees from both organizations received regular monthly payments from that country to support them.¹³⁴ In 1995, CIA Director James Woolsey stated that Iran had provided over \$100 million to Hamas, but did not provide details regarding the period of time over which the funds had been provided.¹³⁵

In 2002, an assessment by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service reported that Hamas was receiving between \$3 million and \$18 million each year from Iran, and was being paid \$35 million to fund terrorist attacks by Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) known in Farsi as VEVAK—*Vezerat- e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar*.¹³⁶ Hamas presently receives between \$30 million and \$50 million from Iran each year.¹³⁷ More recently, 'Ali Larijani, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, pledged to provide financial aid to the Hamas-led government of the Palestinian Authority: "We will definitely provide financial aid to the government so that they can stand up against the oppression of America."¹³⁸ Subsequently, Iran reportedly made a pledge to transfer \$250 million to the Palestinian Authority that would follow a cutoff in U.S. and Israeli funding.¹³⁹ Deputy chief of the Hamas Political Bureau Musa Abu Marzuq disputed the report, saying that Iran had pledged to "support the Palestinian people in general, without specifying the kind or amount of support."¹⁴⁰

In response to a request by Hamas, the Iranian government agreed to the opening of a Hamas embassy in Tehran in 1992. Hamas leader Imad Al-'Alami became the organization's first representative to Iran in 1993.¹⁴¹ Iran also promised to provide training for 3,000 Hamas terrorists.¹⁴² At that time, the Al-Quds Force (Jerusalem Force) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) was tasked with providing Hamas with funding and training,¹⁴³ and specialized training camps for Hamas terror operatives were set up outside of Tehran.¹⁴⁴ Logistical support for Hamas activities was provided by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards¹⁴⁵ under the control of Iran's supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Sayyed 'Ali Khamene'i, and by the Hizballah¹⁴⁶ movement in Lebanon.

Iranian president Ahmadinejad is believed to have been a major figure in the formation of the Al-Quds Force¹⁴⁷ when he served as a senior officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps's special "internal security" brigade.¹⁴⁸ He reportedly served as the deputy commander of intelligence for the Al-Quds Force between 1989 and 1991.¹⁴⁹

The Al-Quds Force, led today by General Qassam Sulaymani,¹⁵⁰ is responsible for providing logistical support for foreign terror organizations, including training, providing matériel, and cooperation, and its support of Hamas continues today.¹⁵¹ It is also responsible for initiating and maintaining Iran's ties to Al-Qa'ida.¹⁵² According to a U.S. intelligence analysis of the organization, the Al-Quds Force's training regimen includes guerrilla warfare operations and psychological warfare emphasizing the use of hand grenades, mines, booby-trap techniques, camouflage, and ambushes. The training that it provides for terrorist activities includes assassinations, kidnapping, torture, and the use of explosives. The analysis further stated that the Al-Quds Force has a presence in "most countries with substantial Muslim populations," and "their mission is to form relationships with Islamic militant and radical groups and offer financial support either to the groups at large or to Islamic figures within them who are sympathetic to the principles and foreign policy goals of the Iranian government."¹⁵³

In recent years Palestinian Authority documents captured by the Israel Defense Forces indicate that Iran transferred large sums of money directly to the 'Iz Al-Din Al-Qassam Battalions of Hamas. An intelligence report dated December 10, 2000, by Amin al-Hindi, then head of the Palestinian Authority's Palestinian General Intelligence, noted the transfer of funds by Iran to Hamas and other organizations opposed to the Palestinian Authority. The sum of \$400,000 was transferred by Iran to the 'Iz al-Din Al-Qassam Battalions and another \$700,000 to other Islamist terror organizations opposed to the Palestinian Authority.

The document further indicated that the funds were intended to support the 'Iz al-Din Al-Qassam Battalions and to encourage

suicide bombings. The document also revealed that “ Hamas leadership in Syria [i.e., the Political Bureau] maintains contact with operatives from the `Iz al-Din Al-Qassam Battalions in the Palestinian territories in all matters pertaining to carrying out military [i.e., terror] attacks against Israeli targets.”¹⁵⁴

During the years of Sheikh Yassin’s leadership, Hamas received funding from Iran, but took great care to maintain its independence. Following the targeted assassination of Sheikh Yassin in 2004, the Hamas leadership—now headed by Khalid Al-Mish`al, whose Political Bureau had pioneered Hamas’s ties to Iran—took their relationship one step further and invited the Iranians into Gaza.¹⁵⁵ Hamas has avoided a takeover of its local infrastructure by Hizballah and continues to maintain a certain level of independence as the result of Al-Mish`al’s relationship with Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah of Hizballah.¹⁵⁶

In December 2005 Al-Mish`al visited Tehran, where he met with Iran’s supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah `Ali Khamene`i, and the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran’s official broadcasting network, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, quoted Khamene`i’s words of encouragement to Al-Mish`al: “Resistance along with unity and adherence to Islam’s statutes is the sole way to insure the Palestinian liberation in the future of the country’s people.” Khamene`i further declared, “[The] intifada proved that the Palestinian nation is mightier than the Zionist regime and America.”¹⁵⁷

Al-Mish`al also met with Iranian president Ahmadinejad. Following the meeting, in a statement released from Ahmadinejad’s office, the Iranian president stated, “We are all obliged to heed our religious and divine responsibilities in offering services to the Palestinian movement.”

Ahmadinejad continued, “The Palestinian movement is not a movement restricted to a particular geographic region, but a movement of the entire Islamic *Ummah* [nation] that defines the future fate of Islam, and that is precisely why the enemies of Islam show so much sensitivity toward the Palestine issue.”¹⁵⁸

Ahmadinejad concluded:

*Resistance is the secret for embracing victory, and the main ideal of the Islamic world is the liberation of the entire land of Palestine, the repatriation of all Palestinian refugees to their motherland, and the establishment of a popular political system in Palestine. The honor of Islam needs to be upheld, and we should all keep in mind that it is God that grants victory. Therefore, we all need to have full trust in God, and remain pious, since piety is the secret of our victory against our enemies.*¹⁵⁹

In response to Ahmadinejad’s remarks, Al-Mish`al stated, “The Palestinian nation, Hamas movement [sic] and the Islamic world appreciate the stance adopted by the Islamic Republic of Iran against the usurper regime of Israel and are proud of those stands that are serving the interests of the Islamic nations and the Islamic world.” He continued:

Hamas is committed to restore the natural rights of the Palestinian nation and to liberate all of the occupied territories, including occupied Holy Quds [Jerusalem]. We do not recognize the legitimacy of Israel and are committed to continue with the resistance movement aimed at ending occupation and repatriating all of the refugees.¹⁶⁰

Al-Mish`al further stated, “Despite all the pressure, the Palestinians have become more determined in their struggles, and Hamas will never give up its fundamental strategy, which is resistance.”¹⁶¹

During his trip to Tehran, Al-Mish`al declared on December 15, 2005, that Hamas would increase its attacks against Israel if Israel took military action against Iran’s facilities for the development of nuclear weapons:

Just as Islamic Iran defends the rights of the Palestinians, we defend the rights of Islamic Iran. We are part of a united front against the enemies of Islam.

Al-Mish`al concluded:

Each member of this front defends itself with its own means in its region. We carry the battle in Palestine. If Israel launches an attack against Iran, we will expand the battlefield in Palestine.

We are part of a united front, and if one member of this front is attacked, it is our duty to support them.¹⁶²

More recently, in January 2006, Iranian president Ahmadinejad met with Hamas leader Khalid Al-Mish`al in Damascus, together with the heads of other Palestinian terrorist organizations, including Ramadan Abdallah Shallah of the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine and Ahmad Jibril of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. After meeting with Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad, Ahmadinejad stated:

As far as the Palestinian issue is concerned, we share an absolutely similar position. We believe Palestine is the property of the Palestinians and therefore we will support their struggle. We see their struggle as the only way to expel the enemy and recognize the right of the Palestinian people. In this respect we support the right of return for Palestinian refugees.¹⁶³

Financial Support from Abroad: Saudi Arabia and Gulf States Funding

Charitable organizations operating in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries, and the West form the support network for Hamas's infrastructure throughout Gaza and the West Bank. In 2003, between \$25 million and \$30 million—the majority of the annual Hamas budget—came from these sources.¹⁶⁴

At a two-day conference of Gulf charities held in Doha, Qatar, in February 2006, representatives of charitable organizations operating in the Persian Gulf States declared that they would use official channels to provide aid to the new Hamas government. Muhammad Dhubian of the Mecca charity in Saudi Arabia stated, "If our rulers allow us to collect funds for Hamas, we will do so. If not, we will refrain." Dhubian further commented, "Arab governments will help Hamas, thus opening the door to charities to follow suit."¹⁶⁵

Hamas has been supported by Saudi Arabia since its early days in Gaza, and has enjoyed support from nonofficial organizations and individuals in the Gulf States.¹⁶⁶ In 1998 the Saudi government welcomed Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin as an official guest of

the kingdom and presented him with a gift of \$25 million that was donated by a member of the royal family. The Saudi royal family member was reported to be then Crown Prince Abdallah,¹⁶⁷ who is today King Abdallah.

Saudi funds for Hamas have been also collected and disbursed by official Saudi government bodies and private organizations. Documents captured from the Palestinian Authority by Israel in 2002 indicate that funds from Saudi Arabia's International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) were sent to local Hamas charitable committees, also known as *zakat* committees.¹⁶⁸ A document from the IIRO that was submitted to the Palestinian Authority listed fourteen committees and organizations that were given a total of \$280,000. All fourteen were affiliated with Hamas. The report noted that the funds were provided for the support of the Hamas committees and organizations as well as for those who were killed and wounded¹⁶⁹ in clashes with Israeli troops.

Additionally, a letter dated January 9, 2001, from the Palestinian Authority representative in Saudi Arabia to Yasir Arafat provides a list of individuals who were killed in the intifada; the list was given to him by the Saudi Committee to Support the Al-Quds Intifada. Payments from the committee were made to the families of the individuals on the list, of whom the majority were Hamas terrorists. Hamas itself claimed responsibility for these attacks and specifically named the individuals involved. The remainder was from joint attacks between members of Hamas and Arafat's Fatah organization.¹⁷⁰

In May 2002, Saudi Arabia Television Channel 1 broadcast a national telethon to raise funds for the Saudi Committee to Support the Al-Quds Intifada (also known as the Saudi Committee for the Relief of the Palestinian People), which was created by Prince Na'if bin Abd Al-Aziz, the Saudi minister of the interior, in 2000.¹⁷¹ The telethon committee responsible for raising the funds and their disbursement consisted of the Saudi Ministries of Information and Interior, the Governorate of Riyadh, and the Saudi Committee for Supporting the Al-Quds Intifada. Saudi Arabia's interior minister,

Prince Na'if, was responsible for the “overall operation of depositing the money into the special account” of the Saudi Committee at the National Commercial Bank in Saudi Arabia.¹⁷²

Muhammad Al-Biker, the executive manager of the Saudi Committee to Support the Al-Quds Intifada, told the Saudi newspaper *Arab News*, “We support the families of Palestinian martyrs, without differentiating between whether the Palestinian was a bomber or was killed by Israeli troops.”¹⁷³ The newspaper further noted, “*Arab News* has been shown official documents of the deposits to the families of Palestinian martyrs. The signatures, full name, and ID number of the recipients are clearly shown. During the past one year and a half, the committee carried out successfully 13 programs in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The Saudi Committee for Supporting Al-Quds Intifada [sic] undertakes 12 programs in the occupied territories.”¹⁷⁴

Another captured document from the Palestinian Authority dated March 17, 2002, indicated that the Hamas-affiliated Tulkarm Zakat (Charitable) Society received its tenth payment totaling 2,040,000 Saudi riyals—\$545,000—from the Saudi Committee to Support the Al-Quds Intifada. The payments were made to 102 families whose sons were killed during the intifada, and 20,000 Saudi riyals—\$5,340—were paid to each family. The list includes the names of known Hamas “martyrs”—i.e., suicide bombers—who carried out attacks in Israel.¹⁷⁵

In 2003 a reported 60 percent of Hamas's budget—between \$12 million and \$14 million—came from Saudi Arabia.¹⁷⁶ As result of U.S. pressure, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states reduced their funding of Hamas in 2004.¹⁷⁷ A year later, however, Saudi Arabia renewed its funding of Hamas through the Saudi Committee to Support the Al-Quds Intifada. In August 2005 an appeal was made on Saudi Arabia's Iqra' TV to raise funds for the Saudi Committee to Support the Al-Quds Intifada. Donors to the committee were requested to send their donations to “Joint Account 98,” which is located at “all banks in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”¹⁷⁸

In September 2005, a senior Hamas leader named Ya'aqub Abu'Assab from the Jerusalem neighborhood of Al-Sawana was

arrested by Israeli security forces. Abu 'Assab, who was active in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron, and Ramallah, is believed to have acted as a West Bank liaison to Hamas headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Abu 'Assab reportedly admitted to investigators that he received hundreds of thousands of dollars from Hamas headquarters in Saudi Arabia. He also reportedly received instructions for Hamas activities from Saudi Arabia and reported on Hamas activities in his area.¹⁷⁹

The Palestinian Authority Ministry of Finance under Mahmud Abbas's Fatah-led government reported that for 2005 \$210 million out of the Palestinian Authority's over \$360 million in budget support was provided by four Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Kuwait, and Qatar.¹⁸⁰ Since Hamas's victory in the Palestinian elections, two of those countries, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, pledged to donate \$33 million to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority.¹⁸¹ At the March 2006 Arab League summit held in Sudan, Hamas lobbied the leaders of the assembled Arab nations to triple their financial support for the Palestinian Authority from \$55 million per month to \$170 million per month.¹⁸² The leaders of the Arab League did not respond to the request for additional aid, but promised to continue aid to the Hamas-led government at the same level, with a specified amount being assigned to each of the Arab countries, as has been done in the past.¹⁸³

In March 2006 Khalid Al-Mish'al led a delegation of Hamas leaders to Saudi Arabia, where government officials assured them of their continued financial and political support. The Hamas leaders were also scheduled to meet with the chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.¹⁸⁴ During their visit, they were hosted at a reception by Sheikh Nasser Al-'Umar, an extremist Saudi cleric who has issued a *fatwa* supporting Iraqi insurgents fighting against American troops. Among the participants in the event were Saudi clerics and Saudi supporters of Al-Qa'ida.¹⁸⁵

The Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas's mother organization, launched an international campaign in late February 2006 to raise funds for the Hamas government. The deputy leader of the Egyptian branch of the Brotherhood, Muhammad Habib, called upon

individuals in the Muslim world to send donations to Hamas via the Arab League, the Red Crescent, and similar organizations. Muhammad Hilal, another Muslim Brotherhood leader, declared that members of the movement were prepared to donate a quarter or more of their monthly salary to the Hamas government. The Muslim Brotherhood intends for its fundraising campaign to supplement the Arab League's financial support in hopes of raising it to \$100 million.¹⁸⁶

Funding from Western Europe

Hamas continues to receive funds from a number of nonprofit charitable organizations in Europe. Two organizations linked to Hamas funding—Le Comite de Bienfaisance et le Solidarite avec la Palestine (CBSP) in France and InterPal, the Palestinian Relief and Development Fund in Britain—were declared illegal terrorist organizations by the Israeli government in May 1997.¹⁸⁷ The CBSP was designated as an SDGT by the United States in 2003.¹⁸⁸ Four offices of the organization operate in France in Paris, Lyon, Lille, and Marseilles. It raises funds among the Muslim population in France, particularly in mosques and Islamic centers focusing on the Palestinian and North African communities. The amount of funds raised by CBSP for Hamas is estimated to be millions of dollars a year.¹⁸⁹

InterPal, or the Palestinian Relief and Development Fund in the UK, reportedly transferred \$6 million to Hamas institutions in 2002. An estimated \$3 million-\$4 million of the funds was used by Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza.¹⁹⁰ InterPal was designated as an SDGT by the United States in August 2003.¹⁹¹ The U.S. Treasury Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence described InterPal's activities in the following manner:

Interpal, headquartered in the UK, has been a principal charity utilized to hide the flow of money to Hamas. Reporting indicates it is the conduit through which money flows to Hamas from other charities, e.g., the Al Aqsa Foundation, and that it oversees the activities of other charities. For example, the Sanabil Association for Relief and Development represents Interpal

in Lebanon. Reporting also indicates that Interpal is the fundraising coordinator of Hamas, a coordination point for other Hamas-affiliated charities. This role is of the type that includes supervising activities of charities, developing new charities in targeted areas, instructing how funds should be transferred from one charity to another, and even determining public relations policy.¹⁹²

InterPal raises funds in the UK among the Muslim population in that country and transfers funds to Hamas-linked charitable and social welfare institutions in the Palestinian Authority areas. The majority of the funds collected by InterPal are collected at Islamic centers, mosques, Muslim conventions, fundraisers, and other social activities.¹⁹³

Hamas also continues to receive funds from the Al-Aqsa Foundation, which has operated in Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, Pakistan, South Africa, and Yemen.¹⁹⁴ In 2001 the Al-Aqsa office in Holland raised \$650,000; in 2002 it raised 600,000 Euros.¹⁹⁵ In 2002 its office in Aachen, Germany, was closed by the German government, and in April 2003, Dutch authorities froze the Al-Aqsa Foundation's accounts.¹⁹⁶ Additionally, criminal charges have been filed against three officials of the Al-Aqsa Foundation in Denmark for supporting terrorism.¹⁹⁷

Nevertheless, the Al-Aqsa Foundation's activities have continued through its other European offices, and via a separate charitable organization in Belgium called the Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA). In 2004, the IARA was designated as an SDGT by the U.S. Treasury Department, which describes the organization as being "responsible for moving funds to the Palestinian territories for use in terrorist activities, notably serving as a conduit to Hamas." The Treasury report continued, "In part, funds were raised through IARA collection boxes marked 'Allah' and 'Israel,' signaling the funds would be directed towards attacks against Israelis. Within the last year, IARA was reportedly linked to the Belgium office of the Al-Aqsa Foundation, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist."¹⁹⁸

Activities in the U.S.



Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzuq

As the result of an internal review in 2002, the FBI estimated that between 50 and 100 Hamas and Hizballah operatives had infiltrated the United States. Following a course in terrorist training in Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries, the operatives were sent to this country and were believed to be engaged in logistics and fundraising activities. The FBI concluded that both terror organizations were capable of launching terrorist attacks within the United States, but did not believe that they intended to do so at that time.¹⁹⁹

Support for Hamas in the United States has been expressed through several organizations, including the now-defunct Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), which distributed an English translation of the Hamas Covenant²⁰⁰ and the organization's communiqués.²⁰¹ A second organization, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, raised funds that have been used to recruit Hamas suicide bombers and to support the families of the suicide bombers. On December 4, 2001, President George W. Bush announced the freezing of the Holy Land Foundation's assets and its designation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the U.S. Treasury:

Hamas has obtained much of the money that it pays for murder abroad right here in the United States, money originally raised by the Holy Land Foundation. The Holy Land Foundation is registered with the IRS as a tax-exempt charity based in Richardson. It raised \$13 million from people in America last year. The Holy Land Foundation claims that the money it solicits goes to care for needy Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Money raised by the Holy Land Foundation is used by Hamas to support schools and indoctrinate children to grow up

into suicide bombers. Money raised by the Holy Land Foundation is also used by Hamas to recruit suicide bombers and to support their families.²⁰²

Subsequent to the arrest of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin in 1989, the external leadership of Hamas led by Musa Abu Marzuq took over the leadership of the movement. From 1989 until 1992, Abu Marzuq reorganized the leadership structure of the movement in Gaza and the West Bank²⁰³ by appointing new leadership²⁰⁴ and sending directives to the West Bank and Gaza from his residence in Falls Church, Virginia.²⁰⁵

During that time Abu Marzuq appointed Muhammad Salah of Bridgeview, Illinois, to be in charge of Hamas's "military affairs,"²⁰⁶ which made him responsible for appointing commanders of the 'Iz Al-Din Al-Qassam Battalions—the wing of the movement responsible for terror attacks—in the West Bank and Gaza. He also disbursed funds and directed their distribution for the terror activities of Hamas by using his own bank accounts.²⁰⁷ From 1990 to 1994, six Hamas attacks were carried out with funds provided by Musa Abu Marzuq. The terrorists who carried out the attacks were recruited by members of the Al-Qassam Battalions who were appointed by Abu Marzuq from the United States.

Muhammad Salah was arrested in Israel in January 1993 for being a member of Hamas and transferring funds to the organization from the United States.²⁰⁸ He was convicted of being a Hamas operative and sentenced to five years imprisonment, and was released in November 1997.²⁰⁹

Eight months after his return to the U.S., Salah was arrested by the FBI on suspicion of transferring funds from a nonprofit organization called the Qur'anic Literacy Institute (QLI) located in Bridgeview, Illinois, to Hamas.²¹⁰ In June 1998, \$1.4 million in assets belonging to him, his wife, and the QLI were seized by the Federal authorities.²¹¹ Salah was alleged to be involved in a money-laundering operation for the purpose of funding Hamas terror attacks in Israel.²¹²

On May 12, 2000, the family of an American victim of Hamas

terrorism filed a civil suit in the United States against U.S. organizations involved in supporting Hamas. In December 2004, a Chicago court awarded \$156 million in damages to the Boim family, whose son David was murdered in a Hamas attack in Israel. The jury found the Holy Land Foundation, the Islamic Association for Palestine, Muhammad Salah, and the Qur'anic Literacy Institute liable in the young man's murder because they helped to finance Hamas.²¹³ The defendants in the case have filed an appeal.

In 2002, Musa Abu Marzuq and his wife, Nadia Elashi, were indicted in absentia with five of her cousins from Dallas, Texas, who were owners of a computer company known as the Infocom Corporation: Bayan Elashi, Basman Elashi, Ghassan Elashi, Ihsan Elashi, and Hazim Elashi. They were indicted for making illegal shipments of technology to Libya and Syria, two states that are designated as state sponsors of terrorism, and concealing monetary investments worth \$250,000 that Abu Marzuq and his wife had made in the Infocom Corporation. They were additionally charged with sending revenue checks from Abu Marzuq's investment in Infocom to Nadia Elashi and concealing that activity as well.²¹⁴ Abu Marzuq has been designated by the U.S. Treasury as a Specially Designated Terrorist since 1995. The five brothers and Infocom Corporation were convicted on July, 8, 2004, of engaging in a conspiracy to violate the U.S. Export Administration Regulations and the Libyan Sanctions Regulations. Additionally, each of the brothers was found guilty of conspiracy to file false shipper's export declaration forms and making false statements.²¹⁵

Three of the brothers—Bayan Elashi, Ghassan Elashi, and Basman Elashi—together with Infocom were specifically charged with “dealing in property in which a Specially Designated Terrorist [i.e., Abu Marzuq] had an interest.”²¹⁶ On April 14, 2005, Bayan Elashi, Ghassan Elashi, and Basman Elashi and Infocom were convicted of conspiring to deal in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Two of the brothers, Bayan Elashi and Ghassan Elashi, were each convicted on ten counts of dealing in the property of the Specially Designated Terrorist and nine counts of money laundering. Basman Elashi was convicted of

dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist.²¹⁷

Saddam Hussein's Support of Hamas

*We are glad of the Istishhadiyah [martyrdom] and heroic spirit of the Palestinian people. By Allah, what the Palestinian people does is beyond my expectations.*²¹⁸

Former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein

Following the collapse of the Oslo Accords in 2000, Khalid Al-Mish'al spent a great deal of time visiting Baghdad to confer with Taha Yasin Ramadan, the former vice president of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime. From September 2000 through the early months of 2003, the Hussein regime provided awards of \$25,000 to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, including those of Hamas.²¹⁹ According to the Arab Liberation Front, a Palestinian pro-Ba'athist organization operating within the Palestinian Authority, Hussein's government paid \$25,000 to each family of a suicide bomber, and \$10,000 to other Palestinians killed in clashes with Israeli soldiers, for a total of \$35 million.²²⁰

At a pro-Iraq rally called by Hamas in Gaza in early January 2003, the leader of Hamas in Gaza at that time, 'Abd Al-Aziz Al-Rantisi, called upon Iraqis to use suicide bombings against American forces in Iraq: “Prepare an army of would-be martyrs [suicide bombers] and prepare tens of thousands of explosive belts. The American aggressors, the American invaders are now on Iraqi soil; therefore, Iraqis must confront them with all possible means, including martyrdom [suicide] operations.”²²¹

Al-Rantisi continued, “Blow yourselves up against the American army. Bomb them in Baghdad. We say to the United States that their flag will go down while the Iraqi flag shall fly everywhere.”²²² Hamas founder Sheikh Yassin echoed the call by urging Iraqis “to destroy every [American] tank, to kill every [American] soldier.”²²³

Hamas and Al-Qa`ida

While Hamas has focused its energies on Palestinian-controlled areas, Al-Qa`ida has emerged as a sister Sunni Muslim extremist ter-

ror organization with Muslim Brotherhood roots. It was therefore not surprising that Hamas has had some contact and cooperation with Al-Qa`ida. At the same time, Hamas's desire is to keep its followers focused on the Palestinian cause as its special role in the larger jihadist movement. In Hamas's view, Al-Qa`ida's role is to focus on the larger conflict, while Hamas's task is to focus on its jihad against Israel.

In June 2000, Nabil `Ukal was arrested for allegedly planning to carry out a series of terrorist attacks in Israel. `Ukal was reportedly first sent by Hamas to Pakistan in 1997,²²⁴ where he studied terrorism tactics in the training camps of Al-Qa`ida.²²⁵ A network of Palestinians within Al-Qa`ida assisted him in traveling to the training camps and subsequently became his contacts to the organization when he returned to Gaza and initiated his plans to carry out attacks there.²²⁶

`Ukal was instructed upon his return to set up a network in Israel to recruit and train Palestinian operatives for the organization.²²⁷ In September 2000, he was charged with receiving military training in the terrorist camps of Al-Qa`ida, belonging to the radical Hamas movement, and plotting to build mobile-phone bombs and kidnap Israeli soldiers.²²⁸

Several months after his arrest, an additional twenty-two members of the network were arrested. Members of the network included operatives of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad from the West Bank and Gaza and members of the Islamic Movement from the Israeli Arab population. The recruits were to be sent to Al-Qa`ida training camps in Afghanistan.²²⁹

`Ukal also reportedly received financial and other types of assistance from the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Yassin. After he returned from his 1997 trip to the training camps, Sheikh Yassin learned of `Ukal's training and provided him with \$5,000. Subsequently, Yassin gave `Ukal another \$5,000 when `Ukal told him that he planned to go back for additional training from Al-Qa`ida in June 2000. `Ukal was prevented from departing for a second course of training when he was arrested while attempting to depart from Gaza International Airport.²³⁰

In recent years, Hamas has viewed Al-Qa`ida as a reinforcement against local competition from Hizballah, which has been competing with Hamas for followers among the Palestinians. It has also made a number of efforts to make contact with Al-Qa`ida in order to bolster its operational and financial capabilities. Jordanian security sources reported in 2003 that two agents of Hamas went to Afghanistan to recruit members of the Al-Qa`ida network to join its operations.²³¹ Hamas operatives were also reported to have made contact with Al-Qa`ida for financing and operational purposes. Additionally, three Hamas operatives were arrested by Israel in 2003 after they returned from an Al-Qa`ida training camp in Afghanistan.²³²

Hamas and Fatah

The relationship between Hamas and Fatah has been a complex one. At various times, both organizations have cooperated with one another and, at other times, openly confronted one other with violence.

Since the emergence of Hamas in 1988, there has been an atmosphere of competition between the followers of Yasir Arafat's Fatah movement and the followers of the Muslim Brotherhood who established Hamas. With the advent of the Oslo Accords in 1994 and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, efforts were made by Arafat's Fatah movement and Hamas to arrive at a mutual understanding to avoid internecine violence. These efforts have led to a series of informal agreements between the PA and Hamas.

In September 1995, an understanding was reached between the PA and Hamas. It provided for an undertaking by Hamas not to carry out terror attacks in or launch attacks from territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority.²³³ This provision allowed Hamas to continue carrying out terror attacks while avoiding causing the PA embarrassment.

Over the past decade the PA also made efforts to co-opt members of Hamas within its own political structure by appointing members of the movement to ministerial positions, including the Gaza Hamas leader Imad Faluji, who served as the Palestinian

Authority's minister of sports. Efforts by the PA to recruit members of Hamas into the PA's Preventive Security Services (PSS) were a prominent feature of the PA's policy toward Hamas. Muhammad Dahlan, head of the Palestinian Authority's PSS in Gaza, declared in a 1998 interview that the recruitment of such individuals into his Preventive Security Service is a "personal goal": "We have enlisted into the ranks of the Preventive Security Service many of our brothers active in other organizations opposed to the [peace] agreement and I have considered this to be a personal goal."²³⁴

In April 2005 Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas made another effort to co-opt armed members of Hamas and other terrorist organizations into the Palestinian security services; they were required to pledge in writing that they would refrain from carrying out terror attacks in exchange for a job in the Palestinian security forces or in one of the Palestinian Authority's government ministries.²³⁵ Although a reported 90 percent of the members of the terrorist organizations signed the pledge and accepted positions within the Palestinian Authority, they simultaneously continued their violent activities.

As a result of Hamas's victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, Hamas has started to make demands of Fatah. On February 8, 2006, Hamas demanded that PA president Abbas turn over three of the Palestinian Authority's security force branches that were controlled by Fatah to come under the command of Hamas. They include the "regular" police, the counterintelligence force, and civil defense.²³⁶ Abbas has refused to do so.

Hamas's Victory in the Palestinian Elections: "Islam Is the Solution"



*Hamas will not recognize Israel. We will not give legitimacy to occupation.*²³⁷

Hamas leader Khalid Al-Mish'al, February 2006

*Hamas is not shocked by this overwhelming victory. We did not fall upon Gaza from the moon. We are living in this society and know what the street wants and what their conscience is. As for a future government, we are putting all the possibilities on the table. What has the Israeli government presented to us? Nothing. Oslo is not only dead, it has rotted.*²³⁸

Mahmud Al-Zahar, Hamas leader in Gaza, January 2006

Although Hamas had anticipated a great increase in its political power within the Palestinian Authority as a result of its winning the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, it did not announce a detailed plan for the reform of the Palestinian Authority. In actuality, Hamas had hoped that it would become an influential force within the Palestinian Authority rather than the governing structure of the Palestinian Authority. In a pre-election interview with Al-Jazeera, Mahmud Al-Zahar explained Hamas's political agenda:

We have to cut our relations in all levels with the Israelis and to establish and strengthen our relations with the Arabic and Islamic world through the Egyptian and Jordanian channels. Also, we have to establish an independent economic system and run a very effective educational system. We want to reconstruct Palestinian infrastructure and establish an efficient health services mechanism. All these are known for everybody, and it is not the time to speak about the details.²³⁹

Hamas's plans for reconstructing Palestinian society also include the introduction of Islamic law, or, *shari'a*. After having run on the campaign slogan "Islam is the solution," the same slogan used by Islamic extremist parties affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas is beginning to lay its plans for introducing a program of Islamization to make its extremist interpretation of *shari'a* the "source" of law in the West Bank and Gaza.

Several days after the elections, Hamas leader Sheikh Muhammad Abu Tir declared, "The number one thing we will do is take *shari'a* as a source for legislation. *Shari'a* has a soul in it and is good for all occasions." Abu Tir asserted that Hamas would lead by example and hoped to encourage all Palestinians to observe Islamic law.

He also declared that the introduction of *shari'a* would not mean that alcohol would be banned or that women would be required to wear Islamic headscarves, or *hijab*: “We will not force a woman to wear the *hijab*; we hope that decision will come from inside her. I don’t care to have women put on the *hijab* and then take it off when no one is looking.”²⁴⁰

Abu Tir further elaborated that Hamas planned to completely reorganize the Palestinian educational system. In accordance with Hamas’s interpretation of *shari'a*, boys and girls would be taught in separate classes and a more “Islamic” curriculum would be introduced. In explaining Hamas’s position on the Islamization of Palestinian education, Abu Tir blamed coeducation for the number of suicides in Sweden: “We will take such measures because we look at examples of the West, like Sweden. They have the highest level of coeducation and the highest level of suicides. We would like our children to have a protected environment. We don’t want any distractions for our boys or our girls.”²⁴¹

At the March 2006 meeting of the PA Legislative Council the new Hamas government was ushered in with a vote of approval. As an indication of their plans for the future of the Palestinian Authority, members of the Palestinian parliament chanted the Hamas slogan, “Allah is our goal. The Qur’an is our constitution. The Prophet Muhammad is our model. Jihad is our path. Death for the sake of Allah is our most lofty aspiration.”²⁴²

In a recent interview, Hamas’s cultural affairs minister Dr. Atallah Abu Sabah also spoke of widespread changes in the promotion of Palestinian culture. “In the near future we will check the film archives of the Ministry of Culture, and we will add whatever needs to be added, and whatever needs to be erased, we will erase.” Abu Sabah insisted that the cultural changes that Hamas intends to implement would be carried out through persuasion rather than by force. However, he asserted, “We will try to talk again and again but if that doesn’t work, I would like to remind you of what happened in the 1980s when the Hamas youth movement ‘blew up’ a performance of belly dancers in Gaza. I trust the common sense of our

people who understand what is important in this period of time and do not need belly dancers.”²⁴³

Abu Sabah was also adamantly opposed to the promotion of popular Arabic music. “Do you think that I will agree to the establishment in Palestine of performances of [Egyptian singers such as] Anoshka and Mustafa Qamar? For you that seems appropriate. [But] I will tell the Palestinian people that that does not fit with our culture.” He further promised that the nightclubs located on the Gaza seashore that serve alcohol and feature belly dancing would be closed. “Everything in its time,” Abu Sabah said. “There is no law that permits belly dancing in Palestine, and if there is such a law we will work in the [Palestinian] Legislative Council to rescind it.” Abu Sabah laid the blame on the United States as the source of Palestinians’ moral and cultural problems. “The United States is invading our brains, our hearts, and our bones,” he asserted. “We have to guard our youth from this cultural, ideological, and sexual invasion, since so many of them have fallen victim to it.”²⁴⁴

While many in the West hope that Hamas will change to become somehow more moderate, statements by Hamas leaders since the elections have reaffirmed the organization’s ideological commitment and desire to continue its jihad against Israel. In the platform that it released ahead of the formation of the new Palestinian government, Hamas insisted that “armed resistance against Israel is a legal right and method of achieving Palestinian rights.”²⁴⁵

Hamas continues to view the world with a long-term strategy based on generations rather than decades, and the latest development for them is just one more step in their plan of establishing an extremist Islamic state “*min al-nabr ‘ila al-bahr*”—from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. As an indication of Hamas’s vision for the future, Hamas founder and ideologue Sheikh Ahmad Yassin preached to his followers that Israel would be destroyed by 2027: “I had it from the Qur’an and then from reading history. The Qur’an promises Muslims victory and what God says will be fulfilled.”²⁴⁶

April 2006

NOTES

1. *The Charter of the Hamas—The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)*, Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine Web site at <http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/documents/charter.html>.
2. “Hamas government approved, vows to fight Israel,” Reuters, March 28, 2006; http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-03-28T182118Z_01_L26268658_RTRUKOC_0_US-MIDEAST-HAMAS-VOTE.xml.
3. “Hamas Leader Khalid Al-Mish`al at a Damascus Mosque: The Nation of Islam Will Sit at the Throne of the World and the West Will Be Full of Remorse—When It’s Too Late,” Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch #1087, Feb. 7, 2006; <http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=palestinian&ID=SP108706>; video clip at <http://www.memritv.org/Search.asp?ACT=S9&P1=1024>.
4. “Hamas Leader Mahmud Zahar on Al-Manar TV,” Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) Special Dispatch #1083, Feb. 1, 2006; http://www.memri.org/bin/opener_latest.cgi?ID=SD108306; video clip at <http://www.memritv.org/search.asp?ACT=S9&P1=1014>.
5. “Resistance and Unity Only Way to Liberate Palestine: Leader,” MehrNews.com (Iranian news agency), Dec. 13, 2005; <http://www.mehrnews.ir/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=265249>.
6. “Hamas Leader Vows to Keep Arms,” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Jan. 25, 2006; http://www.iribnews.ir/Full_en.asp?news_id=206338.
7. “Palestinians Give Suicide Bomber a Hero’s Funeral,” Associated Press, Jan. 15, 2004.
8. “The Islamic Resistance Movement—Hamas—General Introduction,” Palestine Information Center, Official Hamas movement English language Web site; <http://www.palestine-info.com/hamas/index.htm>, Nov. 20, 2001.
9. Emblem of the Islamic Resistance Movement—Hamas, *Al-Markaz Al-Filistini lil`ilam*, Palestine Information Center, official Hamas movement Web site in Arabic; <http://www.palestine-info.info/arabic/hamas/index.htm>, Feb. 2006.
10. “Israeli Missile Strike Kills Hamas Founder,” *Chicago Tribune*, March 22, 2004.
11. “Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas Calls for Continuation of Palestinian Uprising,” Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio, Jan. 13, 1989; translated in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, Jan. 16, 1989.
12. “Militant Islamic Movement Upstages PLO in West Bank Uprising,” *Washington Post*, Dec. 17, 1989.
13. “Israelis Round up Hamas ‘Hit Squad,’” *Guardian* (UK), Jan. 7, 1993.
14. “‘Iz al-Din al-Qassam: An Inspiration for Muslims in Palestine,” *Muslimmedia* (Islamic extremist Web site), March 16-31, 1999; <http://www.muslimmedia.com/archives/special99/izz-din.htm>.
15. “Hamas vs. Abbas: The Lethal Wild Card, a Profile,” *Ha’aretz* (Israeli daily), Jan. 29, 2006; <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=529909&displayTypeCd=1&sideCd=1&contrastID=2>.
16. *The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS)—Palestine*, released by *Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya (Hamas) Filistin—Al-maktab Al-`alami*—“Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)—Information Office,” on 1 Muharram 1409 Hijri/August 18, 1988; Cornell Middle East and Islamic Studies Collection Web site; <http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/hamas.htm>; February 1, 2006. Document is described as, “A verbatim reproduction of the Palestinian Hamas Movement’s own English version of its covenant. [sic] Pagination and line divisions are the same as in the original.”
17. “Israeli Paper Says Islamic Resistance Movement and Unified Command of the Palestinian Uprising Are ‘Secretly Coordinating,’” *Ma’ariv* (Israeli daily), Sept. 22, 1988; translated in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, Sept. 22, 1988.
18. *The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS)—Palestine*, op. cit.
19. “The Messenger” refers to Muhammad, who is designated as *rasul Allah*, the Messenger of God.
20. *Hizb Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun*, Muslim Brotherhood Movement Homepage Web site; <http://www.ummah.net/ikhwan>; Jan. 29, 2006.
21. *The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS)—Palestine*, op. cit.
22. Article Two, *Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS)—Palestine*, ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Article Seven, *Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS)—Palestine*, ibid.

25. “What the Qur’an Teaches: Finding Fault with Dedicated Believers—Commentary by Sayyid Qutb,” *Arab News* (Saudi daily), Jan. 19, 1990. Qutb’s commentary refers to the Qur’an, *Al-Ma’idah* 5:59.
26. Article Seven, *Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS)—Palestine*, op. cit.
27. Article Twenty-Two, *Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS)—Palestine*, ibid.
28. “What the Qur’an Teaches,” *Arab News* (Saudi daily), Dec. 22, 1989. Qutb’s commentary refers to the Qur’an, *Al-Ma’idah* 5:54.
29. “Israeli Paper Says Islamic Resistance Movement,” op. cit.
30. Ehud Ya’ari, “The Outer Intifada,” *Jerusalem Report*, Nov. 1, 2004.
31. “MSA [Muslim Students’ Association of the U.S. and Canada] News Gateway to Hamas,” Web site, Oct. 29, 1998, at <http://msanews.mynet.net/gateway/hamas/>.
32. “*Amaliyat Hamas jihad waqatalaha shuhada’*,” Fadhila Al-’ulama Al-Shaykh Al-Duktur Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, Palestinian Information Center—Hammas movement Web site at <http://www.palestine-info.org>, Oct. 28, 1998.
33. “*Al-ta’asil al-shar’i al-muqawama al-filistiniya*,” Palestinian Information Center—Hammas movement Web site at <http://www.palestine-info.org>, Oct. 29, 1998.
34. “Weapons of the Weak,” *Al-Ahram Weekly*, Dec. 13-19, 2001, No. 564.
35. “Rash of Suicide Bombings in Israel-Palestinian Conflict Sparks Debate among Muslim Clerics,” Associated Press, Aug. 3, 2001.
36. “Weapons of the Weak,” op. cit.
37. Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, *Shari’a al-amaliyat al-istishadiya fi Filistin al-muhtala*—“The Shari’a of Martyrdom Operations in Occupied Palestine,” Feb. 2006, *Al-Markaz Al-Filistini lil’ ilam*, Palestine Information Center, official Hamas movement Web site in Arabic; <http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/fatawa/alamaliyat/qaradawi.htm>.
38. Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, *Fatwa al-’ulama Al-duktur Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi hawla masharika al-nisa’ fi al-’amaliyat al-istishadiya*,—“Fatwa of the Islamic Scholar Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi on the Participation of Women in Martyrdom Operations,” Feb. 2006, *Al-Markaz Al-Filistini lil’ ilam*, Palestine Information Center, official Hamas movement Web site in Arabic; <http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/fatawa/alamaliyat/qaradawi.htm>.
39. Sheikh Ahmad Muhammad Bahr, “*Makanat al-shuhada’ fi al-Islam*”—“The Place of Martyrs in Islam,” Feb. 2006, *Al-Markaz Al-Filistini lil’ ilam*, Palestine Information Center, official Hamas movement Web site in Arabic; <http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/fatawa/studies/shuhada.htm>.
40. “Hammas: Negotiations a Waste of Time,” Al-Jazeera.net, Oct. 22, 2005; <http://64.233.179.104/search?sourceid=navclient-menuext&ie=UTF8&q=cache:http%3A%2F%2Fenglish.aljazeera.net%2FNFR%2Fexeres%2F3EDE68CA-7E56-4BE3-A3A7-513591C58E15.htm>.
41. “Hammas Officials Vow to Continue Fight, Reject U.S. ‘Pressure,’” *Al-Watan* Web site, *Abha*, in Arabic (Saudi daily), Dec. 4, 2001; translated in *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, Dec. 4, 2001.
42. “Devotion, Desire Drive Youths to ‘Martyrdom,’” *USA Today*, July 5, 2001.
43. “Blown Away; From Ignition to Retribution,” *Washington Post*, Jan. 4, 1998.
44. “Devotion, Desire Drive Youths,” op. cit.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. “Suicide Terrorists Find a New Way to Marry into Death,” *Sunday Times*, Sept. 16, 2001.
48. “An Arsenal of Believers,” *Sunday Telegraph*, Dec. 9, 2001.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. “His Father’s Son: the Making of a Bomber,” *Chicago Tribune*, Aug. 27, 2001.
52. “Mideast Notes,” *Jerusalem Post*, Aug. 22, 2001.
53. “A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks Carried Out by Hamas since September 2000,” Israel Defense Forces Spokesperson, April 18, 2004; posted in *Independent Media Review and Analysis*, <http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=20475>.
54. “Hammas May Have Chemical Weapons: CSIS Report Says Terror Group May Be Experimenting,” *National Post* (Canada), Dec. 10, 2003.
55. “Military Court Hears how Hamas Pursued Chemical, Biological Terror,” *Ha’aretz* (Israeli daily), Dec. 10, 2003; <http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=247138&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&subSubContrassID=0>.
56. “A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks Carried Out by Hamas since September 2000,” op. cit.
57. The communiqués in English dating from January of 1999 through January 2004 were located at an earlier version of the Palestine Information Center Web site: “Hammas—The Islamic Resistance Movement” under “Communiqués,” at <http://Web.archive.org/Web/20010925193245/http://www>.

palestine-info.com/hamas/index.htm. The Arabic communiqués are located at “*Sijil Al-Majd—Amaliyat Hamas*,” “The Record of Glory—Hamas Operations,” <http://www.palestine-info.info/arabic/hamas/glory/glory.htm>, Feb. 2006.

58. “*Shuhada’ wa mu`ataqalun*” (“Martyrs and Prisoners”), *Al-Markaz Al-Filistini lil`ilam*, Palestine Information Center, official Hamas Web site in Arabic; <http://www.palestine-info.info/arabic/hamas/shuhda/shuhda.htm>.

59. “Hamas Leader Mahmud Zahar on Al-Manar TV,” MEMRI - Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch #1083, Feb. 1, 2006; http://www.memri.org/bin/opener_latest.cgi?ID=SD108306; video clip at <http://www.memritv.org/search.asp?ACT=S9&P1=1014>.

60. “Israeli Official Discusses Decision to Outlaw Hamas,” Israeli Educational Television translated in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, Sept. 28, 1989.

61. “Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process, Executive Order 12947 of Jan. 23, 1995,” *Federal Register*, Vol. 60, No. 16, Jan. 25, 1995; <http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/eo/12947.pdf>.

62. “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, Appendix B: Background Information on Terrorist Groups,” <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2450.htm>.

63. “Comprehensive List of Terrorists and Groups Identified under Executive Order 13224,” <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2001/6531.htm>.

64. “Council Decision of Dec. 22, 2003, implementing Article 2 (3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision 2003/646/EC,” *Official Journal of the European Union*, Dec. 24, 2003; http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_340/l_34020031224en00630064.pdf.

65. “Fact Sheet on Shutting Down the Terrorist Financial Network,” White House Web site, Dec. 4, 2001; <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011204-11.html>.

66. *Ibid.*

67. “U.S. Freezes Assets of Al-Aqsa, Citing Terror Links; Group Is ‘Critical Part’ of Hamas Terrorist Organization,” U.S. Department of State International Information Programs Web site; May 29, 2003; <http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2004/Jan/07-474588.html>.

68. “Council Decision of Dec. 22, 2003, implementing Article 2 (3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed

against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision 2003/646/EC,” *Official Journal of the European Union*, Dec. 24, 2003; http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_340/l_34020031224en00630064.pdf.

69. “Terrorist Assets Report Calendar Year 2003: Twelfth Annual Report to the Congress on Assets in the United States of Terrorist Countries and International Terrorism Program Designees,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, <http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/reports/tar2003.pdf>.

70. “U.S. Designates Five Charities Funding Hamas,” *op. cit.*

71. “Welcome to KindHearts,” KindHearts Web site, March 31, 2006; <http://www.kind-hearts.org>.

72. “Treasury Freezes Assets of Organization Tied to Hamas,” U.S. Department of the Treasury press release, Feb. 19, 2006; <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js4058.htm>.

73. “Muslim Charity in Ohio Seized,” *Plain Dealer*, Feb. 20, 2006; <http://www.cleveland.com/news/plaindealer/index.ssf:/base/news/114042781899370.xml&coll=2>.

74. “Treasury Shuts Down Muslim Charity,” *OMB Watch*, March 7, 2006; <http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/3313/1/434>.

75. “Treasury Freezes Assets of Organization Tied to Hamas,” *op.cit.*

76. “Mish`al: Hamas Political Leader Seen as New Number One,” Agence France Presse, April 18, 2004.

77. “Fury Builds over Yassin Killing, Thousands Denounce Israel, U.S.,” Agence France Presse, March 26, 2004.

78. *Ibid.*

79. “The Khalid Mish`al Interview [1 of 7],” *Dar Al-Hayat*, Dec. 5, 2003; <http://english.daralhayat.com/Spec/12-2003/Article-20031205-4343f65c-c0a8-01ed-0012-e4cdc62232f8/story.html>.

80. *Ibid.*

81. *Ibid.*

82. *Ibid.*

83. “Mish`al: Hamas Political Leader Seen as New Number One,” *op. cit.*

84. *Ibid.*

85. “Hamas Government Approved, Vows to Fight Israel,” Reuters, March 28, 2006; http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-03_28T182118Z_01_L26268658_RTRUKOC_0_US-MIDEAST-HAMAS-VOTE.xml.

86. “Isma`il Haniya: Portrait of the Hamas Candidate for Palestinian

Prime Minister,” Center for Special Studies Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, March 1, 2006; http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ismail_hniyeh.pdf.

87. “Interview with Isma’il Haniya, Senior Hamas Leader, Discussing the Hamas Decision to Participate in the Palestinian Legislative Elections, Hamas Platform and Agenda,” Al-Jazeera Television, Jan. 19, 2006; Federal News Service, Jan. 22, 2006.

88. “Israel Kills Hamas Rocket Man; Radicals Pound Settlement,” *Peninsula On-line* (Qatari daily), Oct. 3, 2004; http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/Display_news.asp?section=world_news&month=october2004&file=world_news200410232127.xml.

89. “Israeli Missile Strike Kills Hamas Founder,” *Chicago Tribune*, March 22, 2004.

90. “Interview with Isma’il Haniya, Senior Hamas Leader, op. cit.

91. “Profile: Hamas’ Isma’il Haniya,” BBC News, Jan. 27, 2006; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4655146.stm.

92. “Isma’il Haniya: Portrait of the Hamas Candidate for Palestinian Prime Minister,” op. cit.

93. “Profile: Hamas’ Isma’il Haniya,” op. cit.

94. “Isma’il Haniya: Portrait of the Hamas Candidate for Palestinian Prime Minister,” op. cit.

95. Ibid.

96. “Candidate Profiles,” Al-Jazeera.net, Jan. 24, 2006; <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/33378A98-0890-4D13-B258-7FAE8ACDE42B.htm>.

97. “Isma’il Haniya: Portrait of the Hamas Candidate for Palestinian Prime Minister,” op. cit.

98. “Profile: Hamas’ Isma’il Haniya,” op. cit.

99. “Who’s Who in Hamas?” *TimesOnline* (UK), Jan. 26, 2006; <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,251-2010914,00.html>.

100. “Hamas Government Approved, Vows to Fight Israel,” op. cit.

101. “Hamas Chief Talks to WND,” *World Net Daily*, Oct. 10, 2005; http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=46738.

102. “Key Palestinian Figures Speak Out,” Al-Jazeera.net, Jan. 26, 2006; <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/760D299B-D450-4BCE-897D-81CCCC7D7A5F.htm>.

103. “International Community Reacts to Hamas Victory,” CNN.com, Transcripts, Jan. 30, 2006; <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/>

0601/30/ywt.01.html.

104. “The Last Word—Mahmud Al-Zahar,” *Newsweek*, Sept. 5, 2005; <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9108636/site/newsweek/page/2/>.

105. “Profile: Hamas’ Mahmud Zahhar,” BBC News, Jan. 27, 2006; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4653706.stm.

106. “Leadership May Have Passed to Last Founding Member Left Alive,” *Guardian* (UK), April 20, 2004; <http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1195592,00.html>.

107. “Hamas: Negotiations a Waste of Time,” op. cit.

108. “Profile: Hamas’ Mahmud Zahhar,” op. cit.

109. Ibid.

110. “Profile: Mahmud Zahhar, Hamas’ Leader in the Gaza Strip,” Deutsche Presse Agentur, Jan. 26, 2006.

111. “Profile: Hamas’ Mahmud Zahhar,” op. cit.

112. Roni Shaked and Aviva Shabi, *Hamas: M’emunah B’allah L’derekh Hateror* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, Ltd., 1994), p. 150.

113. Ibid., p. 144.

114. Ibid.

115. “Paper Cites Hamas Sources on Movement’s Elections,” *Al-Hayat*, London, in Arabic, March 30, 2004; Global News Wire-Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 30, 2004.

116. “U.S. Rejects Offer of Leader of Hamas Never to Return,” *New York Times*, Aug. 3, 1995.

117. USDC-SDNY, *In the Matter of the Extradition of Mousa Muhammad Abu Marzook*, Affirmation 95, Cr. Misc. 1, October 6, 1995, Statement of Sayid Musamih, Jan. 13, 1991; p. 1-2.

118. Israel’s warrant of arrest of September 27, 1995, charged Abu Marzuq with ten counts, including murder, attempted murder, conspiracy to murder, manslaughter, conspiracy to manslaughter, causing harm with aggravating intent, conspiracy to cause bodily harm, conspiracy to cause aggravated harm and wounding, causing harm and wounding under aggravating circumstances, and conspiracy to commit a felony.

119. “Profile: Hamas Leader Khalid Al-Mish`al,” BBC News World Edition, March 24, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3563635.stm.

120. “Paper Cites Hamas Sources on Movement’s Elections,” op. cit.

121. “Jordanian Paper Confirms Mish`al New Hamas Leader,” *Al-Majd* (Amman, Jordan), Dec. 9, 1996; in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,

Dec. 12, 1996.

122. Aaron Mannes, "Dangerous Liaisons: Hamas after the Assassination of Yassin," *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, 6:4 (April 2004).

123. "Paper Cites Hamas Sources on Movement's Elections," op. cit.

124. "The Khalid Mish'al Interview (3 of 7)," op. cit.

125. "Qallab Dismisses Reports of Deal with Hamas," *Jordan Times*, July 5, 2001.

126. "Hamas Leaders Conditioned Return to Jordan," United Press International, April 17, 2004.

127. P.R. Kumaraswamy, "The Jordan-Hamas Divorce," *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin* 3:8 (Aug.-Sept. 2001); http://www.meib.org/articles/0108_me1.htm.

128. "The Khalid Mish'al Interview (1 of 7)," op. cit.

129. Ibid.

130. "Radicals Call for Resolution against PLO-Israel Accord," Associated Press, Dec. 2, 1993.

131. "Rejectionists Say Popular Mood Swinging their Way," *Guardian* (UK), Dec. 4, 1993.

132. "International News," Associated Press, May 14, 1999.

133. Elie Rekhess, "The Terrorist Connection: Iran, Islamic Jihad and Hamas," *Justice*, Vol. 5, May 1995.

134. "Iran Is Not our Bankroller," *MidEast Mirror*, Dec. 9, 1994.

135. Kenneth Katzman, "Hamas' Foreign Benefactors," *Middle East Quarterly*, June 1995.

136. "Hamas May Have Chemical Weapons: CSIS Report Says Terror Group May Be Experimenting," *National Post* (Canada), Dec. 10, 2003.

137. "Rice to Press for Isolation of Hamas-led Government (Update 4)," Bloomberg.com, Jan. 30, 2006; http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=a0Hkx0ihnm_Y&refer=top_world_news.

138. "Iran Pledges Financial Aid to Palestinian Authority," Reuters, Feb. 22, 2006.

139. "Report: Iran Promises Hamas \$250 Million in Aid," Associated Press, Feb. 28, 2006.

140. "Jerusalem Police Arrest Hamas Leader Abu Tir, Associate," *Ha'aretz* (Israeli daily), Jan. 3, 2006; <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/688885.html>

141. Ehud Ya'ari, "The Metamorphosis of Hamas," *Jerusalem Report*, Jan. 13, 1993.

142. *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, Saudi daily in Arabic, Oct. 7, 1992 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near East and South Asia, Oct. 8, 1992.

143. Ehud Ya'ari, "The Metamorphosis of Hamas," op. cit.

144. "Iran 'Trains Hamas for Terror Offensive,'" *Times* (UK), July 23, 1999.

145. "Hamas Divided Against Itself," Middle East News Items, Info-Prod Research, June 29, 1999.

146. "Jordanian Officials Say Hamas Controls 'Extremist Wing' of Muslim Brotherhood," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 25, 1999.

147. "U.S. Agents Probe Past of Iran's Leader," *Sunday Times* (UK), July 3, 2005.

148. Ibid.

149. "U.S. Presses Ahmadinejad on His Role in Hostage Crisis," *New York Sun*, July 1, 2005.

150. Ehud Ya'ari, "Out of Control," *Jerusalem Report*, Sept. 6, 2004.

151. "Iranian Force Has Long Ties to Al-Qa'ida," *Washington Post*, Oct. 14, 2003.

152. Ibid.

153. Ibid.

154. "Iran as a State Operating and Sponsoring Terror," Intelligence and Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Special Information Paper, April 2003; <http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/iran.htm>.

155. Alex Fishman, "Hayadayim yiday Tehran," *Yediot Aharonot* (Israeli daily), Saturday supplement, April 16, 2004.

156. Ehud Ya'ari, "Unit 1800," *Jerusalem Report*, Oct. 18, 2004.

157. "Supreme Leader Receives Hamas Chief," Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Dec. 13, 2005; http://www.iribnews.ir/Full_en.asp?news_id=203438.

158. "Resistance and Unity Only Way," op. cit.

159. Ibid.

160. Ibid.

161. Ibid.

162. "Iran Hails Hamas Victory," Al Jazeera.net, Jan. 26, 2006; <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/36311D32-6DEB-419E-8EA7-34DEE19C150A,frameless.htm?NRMODE=Published>.

163. "Syria Denies Role in Tel Aviv Bombing," Ynetnews.com, Jan. 20, 2006; <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3203737,00.html>.

164. "Hamas Use of Charitable Societies to Funds and Support Terror," Israel Government Press Office, Sept. 22, 2003, in *Independent Media Review and Analysis*, Sept. 22, 2003; <http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3d=18342>.

165. "Gulf Charities Walk Tightrope on Aid to Hamas," *Daily Star*

(Lebanese daily), Feb. 28, 2006; http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=22535.

166. “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001,” Congressional Research Service, 2001.

167. “Israelis Wary as Tensions among Palestinians Escalate,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, April 14, 1998.

168. “Saudi Money Transferred to Palestinian Terror Organizations,” Appendix E, Center for Special Studies, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center Web site, Aug. 11, 2003; http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/saudi/sa_mappe.htm.

169. Ibid.

170. Ibid.

171. “Washington Misled: Saudi Arabia’s Financial Backing of Terrorism,” *Jerusalem Issue Brief*, May 6, 2002, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs; <http://www.jcpa.org/art/brief1-23.htm>.

172. “Saudi Telethon Funds Go Direct to Palestinian Victims,” *Arab News* (Saudi daily), May 27, 2002.

173. Ibid.

174. Ibid.

175. “Saudi Money Transferred to Palestinian Terror Organizations,” op. cit.

176. “Israeli Intelligence Officials Dismiss Abbas’ Denial of Saudi Aid to Terrorists,” *Jerusalem Post*, Aug. 11, 2003.

177. “Role of Middle Eastern Financial Institutions in Terrorist Networks,” Statement of the Honorable Stuart Levey, under secretary, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Committee on House International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation and House Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Federal Document Clearing House, Congressional Testimony, May 4, 2005.

178. “Saudi Arabia and the War on Terror,” Statement of Daniel Glaser, deputy assistant secretary, Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes United States Department of the Treasury, Committee on Senate Judiciary, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, Nov. 8, 2005.

179. “Hamis Activist who Liaised between Hamas Headquarters in Saudi Arabia and Judea Was Detained in Jerusalem,” Center for Special Studies Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center Web site, Sept. 29, 2005; http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/hamas_sa.htm.

180. “Middle East following Palestinian Elections,” Statement of James

Wolfensohn, Quartet special envoy for Gaza disengagement, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations, March 15, 2006; Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, March 15, 2006.

181. “Hamis Aims to Bid up Islamic Aid,” *Washington Times*, March 9, 2006.

182. “Hamis Asks Summit for Palestinian Aid,” Associated Press, March 27, 2006.

183. Ibid.

184. “Hardline Saudi Clerics Fete Hamis Delegation,” Reuters, March 13, 2006.

185. Ibid.

186. “Egyptian Islamist Group Calls for Donations to Assist Hamis,” *Financial Times*, Feb. 21, 2006.

187. “Amendment to the Proclamation Concerning Illegal Organizations,” Official Government Record [of Israel] #4520, 11 May 1997/4 Iyar 1997.

188. “U.S. Designates Five Charities Funding Hamis,” op. cit.

189. “Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens (CBSP): a French Hamis-affiliated fund which provides financial support for Hamis institutions in the PA-administered territories,” Center for Special Studies Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, March 2005; http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/4_05/img/apr15_05.pdf.

190. “Hamis Use of Charitable Societies to Fund and Support Terror,” Israel Government Press Office, Sept. 22, 2003, in *Independent Media Review and Analysis*, Sept. 22, 2003; <http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3d=18342>.

191. “U.S. Designates Five Charities Funding Hamis,” op. cit.

192. “Additional Background Information on Charities Designated Under Executive Order 13224—InterPal,” U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/charities_execorder_13224-i.shtml.

193. “InterPal,” Center for Special Studies, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, *Special Information Bulletin*, Part Five, Dec. 2004; http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/12_04/interpal.htm#part5.

194. “Additional Background Information on Charities Designated Under Executive Order 13224—Al-Aqsa Foundation,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/charities_execorder_13224-a.shtml#a.

195. " Hamas Use of Charitable Societies," op. cit.
196. "Additional Background Information on Charities Designated," op. cit.
197. Ibid.
198. "Treasury Designates Global Network, Senior Officials of IARA for Supporting bin Laden, Others," Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury, <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js2025.htm>.
199. " Hamas Agents Lurking in U.S., FBI Warns," *New York Sun*, April 29, 2004.
200. Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement— Hamas (Dallas, Texas: Islamic Association for Palestine in the United States, no date).
201. "*Filistin Islami Min Al-babr Ila al-Nabr*"—"Palestine Is Muslim from Sea to River," Hamas Directive #28, Sept. 1998, with English translation by the Islamic Association for Palestine in the United States, Sept. 1988.
202. "President Announces Progress on Financial Fight Against Terror," President George W. Bush, White House Rose Garden, Dec. 4, 2001, U.S. Department of State Web page at: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/2001/index.cfm?docid=6644>.
203. USDC-SDNY, *In the Matter of the Extradition of Mousa Muhammad Abu Marzook*, Affirmation 95, Cr. Misc. 1, Oct. 6, 1995, statement of Sayid Abu Musamih, Jan. 13, 1991, p. 2-3.
204. Ibid., p. 1-2.
205. "U.S. Rejects Offer of Leader of Hamas Never to Return," *New York Times*, Aug. 3, 1995.
206. USDC-SDNY, *In the Matter of the Extradition of Mousa Muhammad Abu Marzook*, op. cit., p. 2-4, 5-6.
207. USDC-SDNY, *In the Matter of the Extradition of Mousa Muhammad Abu Marzook*, Affirmation 95, Cr. Misc. 1, Oct. 6, 1995, statement of Sufiyan Abu Samarah, Jan. 14, 1991, p. 16-17.
208. "Chicago Palestinian Goes on Trial," United Press International, Jan. 31, 1994.
209. "U.S. Prosecutors Suspect an American Citizen of Financing Hamas Terror," *New York Times*, June 14, 1998.
210. "Chicago Islamic Group Said Laundering Funds for Hamas," *Jerusalem Post*, Sept. 7, 1998.
211. "U.S. Prosecutors Suspect an American Citizen," op. cit.
212. "Tycoon in Bin Laden Case 'Linked to Hamas,'" *Daily Telegraph*, Dec. 8, 2001.
213. "Jury Awards \$156M to Family of Teen Slain in West Bank," *USA Today*, Dec. 9, 2004; http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-12-09-slaying-suit_x.htm.
214. *U.S. v. Bayan Elashi, Ghassan Elashi, Basman Elashi, Hazim Elashi, Ihsan Elashyi, Mousa Abu Marzook, Nadia Elashi, and Infocom Corporation*, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, Criminal No. 3:02-CR-052-R (Supersedes Indictment filed on Dec. 17, 2002); <http://files.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/infocom/use-lashi121702sind.pdf>.
215. "Elashi Brothers Convicted," U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney Northern District of Texas press release, July 8, 2004; http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/txn/PressRel04/elashi_conv.pdf.
216. *U.S. v. Bayan Elashi*, et al., op. cit.
217. "More Federal Convictions for Elashi Brothers and Infocom Corporation at Second Trial," U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney Northern District of Texas press release, April 14, 2005; http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/txn/PressRel05/elashi_conv_part2.pdf.
218. "Iraqi Support for and Encouragement of Palestinian Terrorism," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site, Sept. 30, 2002; http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/9/Iraqi%20Support%20for%20and%20Encouragement%20of%20Palestinian.
219. "Palestinians Get Saddam Funds," BBC News World Edition, March 13, 2003; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2846365.stm.
220. Ibid.
221. " Hamas Urges Iraqi Suicide Attacks on U.S.-Led Forces," Reuters, March 21, 2003; <http://www.intellnet.org/news/2003/03/21/18319-.1.html?PHPSESSID=04e210c3f5ce167a53bdde07245086f7>.
222. " Hamas Urges Iraqi Suicide Bombing," BBC News World Edition, Jan. 10, 2003; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2646845.stm.
223. " Hamas Urges Iraqi Suicide Attacks on U.S.-Led Forces," op. cit.
224. "Israelis See Bin Ladin's Hand Creeping into Gaza Strip," *Chicago Tribune*, Sept. 4, 2000.
225. " Hamas Leader Denies Links to Bin Laden," Deutsche Press Agentur, Aug. 22, 2000.
226. "Israelis See Bin Ladin's Hand," op. cit.
227. "Bin Laden Ring Planned Mass Terror Campaign," *Jerusalem Post*, Aug. 22, 2000.
228. "Israelis See Bin Ladin's Hand," op. cit.
229. "Bin Laden Ring Planned Mass Terror Campaign," op. cit.
230. "Israelis See Bin Ladin's Hand," op. cit.

56 Hamas—The Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine

231. "Hamas Goes Global," *Time*, May 26, 2003.

232. "New Islamist Network Seen Emerging from Blasts," *Forward*, May 23, 2003; <http://www.forward.com/issues/2003/03.05.23/news1.html>.

233. "Draft of PNA-HAMAS Accord-Released by *Al-Ahram*," translation of *Al-Ahram Weekly*, Sept. 20, 1995; Independent Media Review and Analysis, Oct. 1, 1995.

234. "PA Security Chief: We Drafted 25 Hamas Members into Palestinian Security Forces to Protect Them from Israel," Independent Media Review and Analysis (IMRA), Sept. 27, 1998, published on the IMRA Web site at: <http://www.imra.org>.

235. "Palestinians Sign Peace Pledge in Exchange for Jobs," *Boston Globe*, April 27, 2005.

236. "Hamas Demands Control over 3 PA Security Force Branches," *Ha'aretz* (Israeli daily), Feb. 8, 2006; <http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/680056.html>.

237. "Key Palestinian Figures Speak Out," Al-Jazeera.net, Jan. 26, 2006; <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/760D299B-D450-4BCE-897D-81CCCC7D7A5F.htm>.

238. Ibid.

239. "Hamas: Negotiations a Waste of Time," op. cit.

240. "The Stern Face of the New Palestine," *The Globe and Mail*, January 28, 2006.

241. Ibid.

242. "Palestinian MPs Shout 'Jihad is Our Path' as Hamas Government Wins Confidence Vote," Middle East Media and Research Institute (MEMRI) TV Monitoring Project, March 28, 2006; Clip #1089, <http://www.memritv.org/Transcript.asp?P1=1089>.

243. "Nilham b'pornografia shemefitza yisra'el b'aza," NRG Maariv web site (Israeli daily), March 30, 2006.

244. Ibid.

245. "Hamas Platform Calls for Continued 'Armed Resistance,'" Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 12, 2006.

246. "Suicide Bomb Restarts Hamas Campaign," *Guardian* (UK), July 10, 2001; <http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4218729-103681,00.html>.



American Jewish Committee

*The Jacob Blaustein Building
165 East 56 Street
New York, NY 10022*

The American Jewish Committee publishes in these areas:

- *Hatred and Anti-Semitism*
- *Pluralism*
- *Israel*
- *American Jewish Life*
- *International Jewish Life*
- *Human Rights*

www.ajc.org

May 2006 \$2.50